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**ABSTRACTS**

**Daniel CITIRIGĂ**, *Central European Federalism. Romanian historiographical perceptions*

The European federalism issue during the inter-war period has been a highly debated subject in the Romanian historiography originating from the Communist period until present times. Despite of it's great importance no Romanian historian preoccupied by this matter fathomed a complex analysis of the subject if we consider that all the monographies published in Romanian refer to projects in which Romania was involved.

The main issues of debate were focused on the Danubian Confederation and the League of Nations' resolutions. Although two of Romania's allies, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, were organized as confederations, were not given sufficient importance, while the federal projects from Baltic Sea area are completely missing from the analyses investigated by us. In spite of the lack of essential information on the subject we are legitimate to emphasize that the Romanian historiography developed two main streams: the ethnocentrist, very similar with the inter-war mentalities and the federal one.

**Radu TUDORANCEA**, *The Turkish-Greek Frontier and the Minority Issue at the End of World War I: Historiographical Approaches*

The purpose of present paper was to evaluate the representation of frontiers and minority (refugees) issue, at the end of World War I, in the official historiography of the two countries(Greece and Turkey).We should stress, first of all, the fact that, whereas Greek historiography looked upon the facts which led to Lausanne episode as being a sort of collective tragedy, often referring to these events as „Asia Minor Catastrophy”, their counterparts, the Turkish historians, perceived the above mentioned events as a complete and heroic victory of the nation. For Greece, the events known under the syntagma „Asia Minor Catastrophy”, were considered a traumatic episode of Modern Greece, being similar to defeat and tragedy, a „decisive blow” to the well-known „Megali Idea”. Turkish historiography tended to place these events under the umbrella of the victorious *War of Independence*, a stage in the making of the Turkish nation-state.

**Florin ANGHEL**, *The „eyes towards the East” Policy: the role of Polish-Romanian Frontier within the „cordon sanitaire” system*

Romanian-Polish frontier had, as a background, the historical boundary of Bucovina with Galitia, a fact which was recognized by the bilateral agreements of 1919, and, later, by the Saint Germain and Sévres peace treaties of 1919-1920. The change of the Polish orientation, during 1921-1927/1928 years, must be seen as a consequence of regional evolutions and also, as an expression of Polish foreign policy. Polonia initiated, in 1921-1926, a massive unofficial campaign, conducted in order to convince Romania to yield a portion of land that would have obviously been an advantage for Poland. The situation was more complicated after the signing of the Convention of defensive alliance (March 3, 1921), which suggested the exchange of territories, in order to solve local issues regarding economy (agriculture), communications and defense of frontiers. But the Romanian Government did not see the issue of territorial exchange only from the point of view of an advantage/disadvantage; thus, Romania decided to support the statu-quo principle, respecting the 1919-1920 peace treaties provisions.

**Simion GHEORGHIU**, *Political-territorial changes in Central and South-East Europe (1938-1944). New historiographical contributions*

After the Second World War the Soviet Union set up its security strategy under territorial terms: the larger was the security ring surrounding it, the stronger was the guarantee that the enemy's strikes were easier to delay. We believe that by reading the sources again, increasing the amount of information and making use of the most recent bibliography, a new image on the politics of the Super Powers in South-Eastern Europe concerning borders and national minorities could be achieved.

**Silviu MILOIU**, *Converging their destinies: Romania and Finland in the new Soviet-Nazi order. (March-September 1940)*

This article approaches the military and diplomatic developments from March to September 1940 and the Finnish and Romanian reactions to them which created the frame for similar concerns and choices from the part of the two states. Comparisons between the rationalities of the international behaviour of the two states and analyses of their perspectives of each other's decisions will be also drawn based on archival sources from Romania, Finland and Great Britain. The convergence of destinies between distant and dissimilar countries such as Romania and Finland is thus a result of the rivalry of interests and the strife between Germany and Soviet Union at their peripheries and of Stalin's reckless disregard of the negative effects of his policies on Soviet Union's best interests. The effects will be clearly discernible a year later when his state and his power were on the brink of dissolution.

**Bogdan Alexandru SCHIPOR**, *From Guarantee to Renunciation. Romania in the British Political Options, 1940-1941*

The ending of the Soviet-Finnish conflict, occurred on March 12<sup>th</sup> 1940, prompted the British reexamine the applicability problem of the guarantees offered to Romania in case of a Soviet aggression. Nevertheless, Neville Chamberlain accepted to publicly renew the guarantees offered the previous year to Greece and Romania, simultaneously inciting the two states to a

common resistance in the face of the aggressors and to an understanding with Bulgaria. The release of the German attack in Western Europe complicated even more Great Britain's position in the south-east of the continent. Although for the time being, London did not consider a Soviet aggression against Romania as imminent, yet if this would take place it was difficult to suppose that the British will be able to make intercession for Bucharest and France's downfall prompted Great Britain to try a new approach towards the Soviets. On the other hand, Great Britain expected Soviet Union to profit from the fact that Hitler was still occupied in Western Europe in order to consolidate its position and materialize its special interest towards Romania. However, the British government did not consider that Bessarabia's, northern Bukovina's and the Hertza District's annexation changed in any way Romania's situation. In any case the guarantees were no longer valid and as long as the Soviets did not endanger Romania's oil resources and inherently, the Romanian oil deliveries for Germany, nothing had changed. In the summer of 1940, as Bulgaria and Hungary more and more aggressively displayed territorial demands towards Romania, neither then did Great Britain's position sustain significant alterations.

However, London agreed that it can win the Soviet Union on its side only by offering something durable, since, for the moment, Germany was capable of offering Moscow much more. Anthony Eden discussed these problems with Great Britain's Prime Minister, Winston Churchill. The two were aware of the fact that, on the whole, Soviets victories had settled the Baltic countries', Bukovina's and Bessarabia's issue. In any case, at the beginning of 1941, diplomatic contacts between Great Britain and Romania had become increasingly rare too. Furthermore, on February 10<sup>th</sup> 1941, the British minister at Bucharest, presented a note to Alexandru Cretzianu whereby informed him of his government decision to recall him and to withdraw the diplomatic mission and the consulates' clerks from Romania. The British Legation's actual departure occurred on February 15<sup>th</sup> 1941, however bilateral contacts continued under the form of personal connections, marking a new stage in the two states' relations.

**Mioara ANTON**, *The illusion of the legitimate frontier. Romanian plans for post-war organization, 1940-1944*

At the end of the 1930s, Germany's drive for 'living space' (*Lebensraum*), and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, caused frontier changes in accordance with German-Soviet interests in Central-Eastern Europe. As a result of this agreement, in the summer of the 1940, Romania lost her frontiers in the East, West and South, being forced to accept the Soviet notes (June) and the German-Italian arbitration in Vienna (August). The German attack on the Soviet Union, in June 1941, allowed Romania to regain her Eastern frontier and re-establish it on the river Dniester. In the context of German war operations, Transnistria became a very sensitive issue for the Romanian government, who did not accept this territory as compensation for the loss of Transylvania. From a Romanian point of view, the main purpose was to obtain only those territories which were lost in 1940. But in the realities of the end of the second world war, the idea of legitimate frontiers proved to be for the Romanian government a very difficult aim, and almost impossible to achieve.

**Cosmin POPA**, *The Political Regimes and Ideological Frontiers of Eastern Europe during the Council of Foreign Ministers Meetings (1945-1947)*

The end of the World War II brought on the agenda of the four victorious powers many political issues, much more difficult to solve than it was to win the war. Once vanished the reason of the war time alliance, different views and interests of each and every one of the four emerged,

thus affecting their co-operation. At the end of the war, Soviet Union directed her military and political efforts towards the enlargement of her boundaries, conducting her actions in order to gain control over as much territory as possible, in Eastern Europe and Far East, as a guarantee for a better stand in the future (a future war against the West). Stalin was convinced that he could gain major concessions, exploiting the differences which existed between Great Britain and United States, thus bringing Soviet Union closer to her strategic objectives.

**Cristian VASILE**, *The Biographies of the „cultural dictators“: Iosif Chişinevschi, Leonte Răutu, and Dumitru Popescu. Sources and prejudices*

Usually, the biography as a genre was disregarded by the Romanian authors, either historians, or literary critics. Mircea Mihaieş – one of the leading Romanian writers – launched in 2008 a debate noticing this neglect in the case of the novelists' biographies. But the same lack of academic books is a reality when one referring to scientific works covering the lives of „cultural dictators“, communist chief ideologists, and party theoreticians.

The paper examines the case of three communist ideologues – Iosif Chişinevschi, Leonte Răutu, and Dumitru Popescu – trying both to identify what obstacles had lain in the path of their biographers and to find out the appropriate methods, historical sources, and ways of avoiding bias, stereotypes, and prejudices while attempting to write their political biographies. Probably, the most dangerous prejudice is the one perpetuated by nationalistic authors suggesting that „the guilt“ of the „cultural dictators“ should be extended to an entire ethnic community.

**Novák Csaba ZOLTÁN**, *„Face to face“. The meeting of the party leadership with the Magyar intellectuals from Romania*

Since 1965 the new Communist party leadership, headed by Nicolae Ceausescu, showed itself keener on the national question as compared with the last ruling years under the leadership of Gheorghiu-Dej. In order to regain the trust of the national minorities, in 1965 a commission working within the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party came into being and was assigned to deal with the nationalities question. Moreover, in June 28, 1968, following the model of the meetings already initiated with the intellectuals, a summit between the supreme leadership of the party and the Magyar intellectual elites from Romania was settled. The Communist leaders had to confront now directly with the most sensitive matters of the Magyar communities in Romania: the instruction in mother language, the juridical status and the cultural life. Despite the fact that several requests were negatively answered, some concrete results may be counted: a TV program in Hungarian and the coming into being of some newspapers, magazines and a publishing house for the minorities, namely the Kriterion Publishing House.

**Vladimir TISMĂNEANU**, *Mihai Botez, the Solitary dissident*

Vladimir Tismaneanu examines the main political and intellectual contributions of former dissident mathematician and futurologist Mihai Botez (1940-1995). In the 1970s and 80s, Botez strove to coalesce collective protest actions against Ceauşescu's erratic policies. Tismaneanu explains the causes of Botez's failure to attain this goal. Fully aware of the oppositional developments in other East-Central European countries, Romanian communist leaders and their instrument, the Securitate, were adamant in preventing any collective critical endeavor. Botez was forced to leave Romania in 1987, stayed in the United States, and after 1992 served as

Romania's ambassador first to the United Nations and then to Washington D.C. Drawing from personal encounters, collaborative projects, and unpublished personal in-depth interviews with Botez, Tismaneanu provides an insightfully enriching evaluation of the late thinker's views on Marxism, Communism, the crisis of the Ceaușescu regime and its strategies to thwart collective dissent and opposition.

**Mihai BOTEZ**, *The Decline of Marxism and the Crisis of Communism*

Mihai Botez published his review-essay on Vladimir Tismaneanu's book *The Crisis of Marxist Ideology in Eastern Europe: The Poverty of Utopia* (New York and London, Routledge, 1988) in the émigré journal *Agora* in 1988. He put forward a series of provocative hypotheses regarding the decline of Marxism as a legitimizing force in Ceaușescu's Romania. In fact, argued Botez, original Marxism had become a relatively marginal and potentially subversive doctrine. This happened as a consequence of the regime's appropriation of nationalist, ethnocentric themes, motifs, and symbols. In agreement with Hungarian dissident philosophers Agnes Heller and Ferenc Feher, Mihai Botez emphasized Tismaneanu's creative understanding of the role of revisionist Marxism in the self-destruction of communist regimes.

**Puiu Dumitru BORDEIU**, *The Legionary Movement and the Vienna Dictate (1940)*

Within the framework of major threats emerging against Romania's territorial integrity in the summer of 1940, culminating with the Vienna Dictate, the pattern of relationships between the political regime led by King Charles II and the members of the Iron Guard Movement took a sinuous course. The Iron Guard's endeavours, meant to preclude Northern Transylvania's loss and subsequently to administer the enforcing of Dictate's provisions failed.

The Movement attempted to assume a „historic mission” which far transgressed its own resources. Its efforts, in this line of action, did not rely a significant inner political and social support while the interests of the Axis powers - Germany and Italy - were unpropitious.

**Petre OTU**, *The Romanian Military perceptions on the second front (1943-1944)*

The study focuses on the way the Romanian military thought during 1943-1944 analyzed the prospects of the opening of a second front in Europe by the western allies of the United Nations. This issue rose at the top of the activities of the military bodies, especially the Ministry of National Defense and the General Staff, after the battle of Stalingrad (November 19, 1942 – February 2, 1943), which ended in a serious defeat for the German army and its allies, including Romania. Another event which stimulated the preoccupations in this direction consisted in the elimination of the German and Italian troops from Northern Africa by the British and American forces at the end of May 1943. From that moment on, the US and Britain intensified the preparations for the assault of Europe, the place where the fate of war was to be decided. This issue was vital for Romania, as the entire political spectrum in Bucharest reached the conclusion that Germany lost the war after the defeat on Volga.

Consequently, the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff and other headquarters and military institutions carefully monitored the general progress of the war and the developments in various theaters of operations in the attempt of determining the intentions of the British-American command concerning the opening of the second front. In order to achieve this, various scenarios, informative syntheses and documentary studies have been elaborated, which analyzed the

possible variants of landing – the Finish and Norwegian coastlines, the French coastlines, the Iberian Peninsula, Italy and the Balkans. The latter enjoyed a privileged place in all these scenarios, as they started from two premises – the experience of the First World War and the desire of the Romanian public opinion that the turning of weapons to benefit from the presence and military support of the US and Britain.

Both premises did not materialize, leading to an especially difficult situation for Romania in the summer of 1944. In spite of this situation, the analyses and studies elaborated during this period remain an important source in the study of this dramatic episode in Romania's participation in the Second World War.

**Cristian VASILE, Vladimir TISMĂNEANU, *The 1956 Tour in Paris of the National Theatre: Foreign Relations Section, Diaspora and Romanian-French Cultural Relations***

After 1953 in the context of the cultural “thaw” the intellectual life seemed dominated by the so called Spirit of Geneva; during this period of relaxation Romania joined the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). After evident cases of cooperation during the Cold War such as the Geneva conferences of 1953 and 1954, the Romanian authorities were somehow forced to adopt addresses towards Western world preeminently attractive rather than threatening; it allowed the idea of concession and compromise between East and West. The policy makers' were compelled to temporarily abandon their minds which were shaped by a dichotomic view and to conceive a new cultural strategy towards the West.

The Romanian communists have had to rethink their (cultural) policies concerning the Western Europe and to consider a soft cultural openness. The cultural strategists were aware of the cardinal importance of the normalization of cultural relations with France. Probably a clarification in the policies of External Relations Section/Agitprop occurred at the beginning of 1956 while accepting on behalf of the National Theater in Bucharest the invitation to join the International Festival of Drama (also as a hope in the possibilities of negotiation with France and with some representatives of the Romanian émigrés in France; nevertheless, the capitalist countries and the Romanian political refugees in the West remained *the enemies*). In the summer of 1956 took place an event which had many implications. For the first time after two decades the Romanian National Theater accomplished a tour in Paris. Two plays were presented: *A Lost Letter*, directed by Sică Alexandrescu, and *The Last Hour*, directed by Moni Ghelerter. In fact, the two directors cast the most prominent actors and actresses of the Romanian drama in the 1950s such as: Marietta Sadova, Ion Manolescu, Maria Filotti, Radu Beligan, who had also important artistic connections, peers or relatives in French capital. The communist power attached one important ideological supervisor of the delegation – Pavel Câmpeanu, instructor and later head of sector within External Relations Section of the Central Committee, and subordinate of the “eternal comrade” Ghizela Vass. Probably Pavel Câmpeanu is better known as Felipe Garcia Casals because in the 1980s he published under this pseudonym an interesting book, *The Syncretic Society*, with a foreword by Alfred G. Mayer, which was the work of a neo-Marxist and dissident sociologist in contrast with 1950s *apparatchik*. Pavel Câmpeanu played the most important part in this ideological choreography of the Paris Tour. On July 23, 1956 at the end of the journey Pavel Câmpeanu drew up a document: “Information concerning some problems with regard to the Romanian National Theater tour in Paris (June-July 1956)”, which proved that he watched directly the 1950s strategies of control, infiltration and instrumentalization of the Romanian exile community.

**Gavin BOWD**, *Une amitié finissante: le Parti communiste français et la Roumanie en 1986 (A Coming to an End Friendship: French Communist Party and Romania in 1986)*

The relationships between French communists and their Romanian peers do not represent a good and moving example of traditional and famous „French-Romanian Friendship“. In spite of the old connections between PCF and RCP establish during Spanish Civil War and then during Nazi Occupation of France (Valter Roman, Boris Holban, Mihail Florescu, and Gheorghe Vasilichi – are few examples), these relations became tense beginning with the end of 1950s. The nationalistic turn adopted by the RCP, the independent, anti-Soviet trend, favorable to Mao’s China, and the improvement of bilateral relations with general de Gaulle’s France, all these elements antagonized PCF – the most pro-Soviet Western communist party – and Romanian communist leadership. Nevertheless, PCF did not break the relations with RCP until 1989: there were visits, research bilateral exchanges, meetings, and other reunions attended by various leaders, and vacations at the Black Sea seaside. The document published below offers a assessment on bilateral relations at the end of the „really existing Socialism“.