

IMPLICAREA ROMÂNIEI ÎN CONFLICTELE BALCANICE REFLECTATĂ ÎN CORESPONDENȚA DIPLOMATICĂ BRITANICĂ (1912–1913)

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Lucrarea de față are drept sursă corespondența diplomatică britanică din anii 1912–1913, mai precis rapoartele anuale trimise *Foreign Office*-ului de ministrul englez la București, Sir George Barclay¹. Acesta nota că regele Carol și primul-ministru Titu Maiorescu îi reproșaseră adesea dezinteresul Marii Britanii față de România, atitudine vizibilă și prin faptul că titularul legației se schimbase foarte des sau că personalul diplomatic era insuficient². Relativa indiferență britanică, o splendidă izolare de agitația ce cuprinsese capitala în perioada tulbură ce prevestea sfârșitul unei epoci în istoria politicii externe românești, nu a însemnat că Barclay a fost un spectator indiferent al realităților românești, pe care le-a urmărit și prezentat cu claritate în rapoartele sale din anii 1912–1913. Poate tocmai această relativă detașare l-a făcut pe ministrul britanic să sublinieze și sumedenia de erori de natură diplomatică, de calcul politic sau de oportunitate militară, toate transformând implicarea românească în criza balcanică într-o veritabilă tragi-comedie a erorilor diplomatice și militare. Astfel că prezentul articol va insista asupra implicării diplomatice a României în cele două războaie balcanice, privind lucrurile, într-o abordare cu subtitluri de comedii shakespeariene, din perspectiva acestor erori de apreciere sau oportunitate, așa cum au fost ele văzute de britanicul Barclay³.

Prima eroare sau „mult zgomot pentru nimic”. Mobilizarea statelor balcanice în septembrie 1912 a luat guvernul român prin surprindere. Regele Carol afirma că opinia privind iminența unui război în Balcani era ridicolă și chiar și atunci când au

¹ Câteva dintre rapoartele uzuale au fost publicate în *British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898–1914*, editat de G. P. Gooch și Harold Temperley, vol. IX, *The Balkan Wars*, Londra, 1934.

² Referințe la anexa documentară de la finalul acestei introduceri – Roumania: Annual Report (mai departe RAR), 1912/8.

³ Pentru prezentarea implicării diplomatice a României în conflictele balcanice, a se vedea monografiile și sintezele dedicate acestei teme în ultimele două decenii, dintre care menționăm: Anastasie Iordache, *Criza politică din România și războaiele balcanice: 1911–1913*, București, 1998; Gheorghe Zbucă, *România și războaiele balcanice: 1912–1913. Pagini de istorie sud-est europeană*, București, 1999; Daniela Bușă, *Modificări politico-teritoriale în sud-estul Europei între Congresul de la Berlin și primul război mondial (1878–1914)*, București, 2003, p. 237–284; Claudiu-Lucian Topor, *Germania, România și războaiele balcanice (1912–1913)*, Iași, 2008; Nicu Pohoată, *Politica externă a României în timpul războaielor balcanice (1912–1913)*, București, 2011.

înțeles că acesta va izbucni, suveranul și guvernanții de la București au rămas convinși în victoria finală a turcilor. Aceasta semnifica și păstrarea *statu quo*-ul regional, garantat prin intervenția puterilor europene, ceea ce nu permitea extinderea teritorială a Bulgariei⁴. Astfel, agitația din Balcani a părut inițial doar mult zgomot pentru nimic.

A doua eroare sau „îmblânzirea scorpiei”. Când au realizat această greșeală, autoritățile românești au reacționat disproporționat și pripit, sub imperiul spaimei că războiul avea să se încheie înainte ca România să obțină satisfacție. Bulgarii făcuseră câteva tentative de a obține neutralitatea României în schimbul unor compensații teritoriale. Propunerile lor au fost respinse, căci regelui Carol îi displăceau bulgarii și nu avea încredere în suveranul de la Sofia⁵. Astfel că vreme de aproape cinci luni, relațiile dintre România și Bulgaria au ținut de povestea îmblânzirii scorpiei, fiecare văzând în cealaltă parte nesuferitul personaj. În vreme ce Maiorescu încerca să convingă Bulgaria prin amenințarea tacită cu mobilizarea, vecinii sudici răspundeau invidiei crescânde a românilor printr-o abilă politică de tergiversare. Devenea tot mai clar, sublinia Barclay, că „extinderea teritorială a Bulgariei, coșmarul politicienilor români, se vedea la orizont”⁶, iar la București nemulțumirea față de pasivitatea guvernanților era în creștere. Agitația unor facțiuni conservatoare mai belicoase și a liberalilor din opoziție sporea presiunea asupra bătrânului Maiorescu⁷, încă puțin dispus să riște o mutare câștigătoare. România calculase greșit momentul când putea obține o compensație de la bulgari fără a le stârni și resentimentele. În noua situație, dacă reușea să obțină ceva, guvernul de la București căpăta și dușmănia iremediabilă a bulgarilor. Și trebuie să ținem cont, continua Barclay, „că dacă se va ivi ocazia ca România să încerce să-și realizeze visele iredentiste în privința Transilvaniei și Bucovinei, bunăvoința Bulgariei era de mare valoare”⁸.

A treia eroare sau „o poveste de iarnă”. În decembrie 1912, agitația diplomatică a atins un punct sensibil odată cu cererea României de a obține o rectificare de frontieră în sudul Dobrogei, pe linia Turtucaia – Balcic. Negociatorul Stoian Danev a vizitat Bucureștii, fiind primit de regele Carol și având lungi întrevederi cu Maiorescu și Take Ionescu. Danev a continuat politica de tergiversare, în vreme ce românii încă oscilau între atitudinea echilibrată (și pe placul puterilor) de a localiza conflictul și frustrarea de a simți că soluția diplomatică eșua încet, dar sigur⁹. Într-o

⁴ RAR 1912/1 și 22.

⁵ RAR 1912/22.

⁶ RAR 1912/3.

⁷ RAR 1912/3, 23 și 25.

⁸ RAR 1912/6.

⁹ RAR 1912/23. O analiză recentă a politicii recente românești în acea perioadă, în Nicu Pohoată, *Diferendul teritorial româno-bulgar și relațiile României cu Puterile Centrale în timpul conferinței de pace de la Londra (decembrie 1912 – ianuarie 1913) și România și Antanta în timpul conferinței de pace de la Londra (decembrie 1912 – ianuarie 1913)*, în „Cogito”, t. III, nr. 4, decembrie 2011 (online, pe site-ul publicației electronice, <http://cogito.ucdc.ro/arhiva.html>, accesat pe 10 februarie 2014).

mare dilemă diplomatico-militară, România continua să rămână pasivă. Astfel că, nota ministrul britanic, tot mai mulți se întrebau la București dacă „nu era mai bine ca România să fie în fruntea statelor balcanice decât la coada puterilor europene”¹⁰. Toată această lipsă de decizie făcea ca utilitatea negocierilor româno-bulgare de la Londra și Sofia să fie o simplă poveste frumoasă de iarnă.

A patra eroare sau „zadarnicele chinuri ale dragostei” româno-austro-ungare. În 1912, Barclay a urmărit cu maximum interes atitudinea curtenitoare a diplomației de la Viena, atât de fățișă încât românii înșiși se simțeau jenați de o efuziune ce putea stârni bănuielile Rusiei și Bulgariei. Vizitele la București ale contelui Berchtold și ale generalului Conrad von Hötzendorf alimentaseră speculațiile presei privind existența unei alianțe militare între cele două state¹¹. Însă Barclay nota că „aceste semne de curtoazie pot fi interpretate și drept un semn al faptului că Viena nu era complet sigură că poate păstra România pe orbita sa”¹². În toată această perioadă politica românească a fost bine coordonată cu diplomația austriacă, tratatul de alianță fiind prelungit în februarie 1913. Însă obiectivele celor două state mai corespundeau doar în mică măsură, aspect ce rezulta și din îmbunătățirea vizibilă a relațiilor cu Rusia. Regele român a primit înalta distincție de feldmareșal al armatei ruse, iar diplomația țaristă făcea eforturi aparent sincere ca Bulgaria să accepte cererile României, care la St. Petersburg nu erau considerate drept excesive¹³.

A cincea eroare sau „măsură pentru măsură”. Guvernul de la București se temea că Bulgaria urmărea ocuparea Dobrogei, dovada fiind existența unor hărți militare ce indicau teritoriul dobrogean drept partea încă neeliberată a Bulgariei Mari. Astfel că, nota Barclay, o extindere teritorială a Bulgariei nu era privită la București doar cu gelozie, ci cu veritabilă alarmă. Revizionismul românesc era motivat în două moduri: Take Ionescu considera că România era îndreptățită la compensație teritorială deoarece doar neutralitatea sa permisesese succesul aliaților balcanici, precum și pentru că modificările de graniță din peninsula afectau situația vlahilor sud-dunăreni; Maiorescu nega că România dorea compensație pentru

¹⁰ RAR 1912/6 și RAR 1913/4 și 9.

¹¹ RAR 1912/11–12. Detalii în Claudiu-Lucian Topor, *România, Austro-Ungaria și războiul din Balcani. Vizita la București a generalului Conrad von Hötzendorf, 28–30 noiembrie 1912*, în „Analele Științifice ale Universității «Al. I. Cuza» din Iași”, Istorie, serie nouă, t. LI, 2005, p. 189–200.

¹² RAR 1912/13. Evoluția relațiilor dintre guvernele de la București și Viena, în Ema Nastovici, *Unele probleme privind relațiile dintre România și Austro-Ungaria în ajunul primului război mondial*, în „Analele Universității București – Istorie”, t. XXI, nr. 1, 1972, p. 47–69 și Claudiu-Lucian Topor, *Austro-Ungaria și diferendul româno-bulgar în chestiunea Silistrei (1912–1913)*, în „Analele Științifice ale Universității «Al. I. Cuza» din Iași”, Istorie, t. XLVII–XLVIII, 2002–2003, p. 77–95.

¹³ RAR 1912/14–16. Detalii în Nicu Pohoată, *Relațiile româno-ruse și politica Antantei față de România în contextul desfășurării primului război balcanic*, în „Cogito”, t. III, nr. 3, septembrie 2012 și idem, *Relațiile României cu Antanta în perioada premergătoare conferinței de la Sankt Petersburg (ianuarie-martie 1913)*, în *ibidem*, t. IV, nr. 1, martie 2012 (online, pe site-ul publicației electronice, <http://cogito.ucdc.ro/arhiva.html>, accesat pe 10 februarie 2014).

neutralitatea sa și pretindea că, dacă frontierele stabilite în 1878 se modificau, România era îndreptățită la o revizuire care să îndrepte injustețea de atunci¹⁴. Când se adoptase politica „Balcanii pentru statele balcanice”, tratatul de la Berlin fusese masacrat, iar România avea nevoie de o linie defensivă care să-i garanteze investițiile umane și materiale făcute în Dobrogea. Și puterile europene au intervenit oportun, interesate să medieze sau să arbitreze disputa româno-bulgară¹⁵. Însă protocolul de la Petersburg era o soluție ce nu mulțumea pe nimeni¹⁶. Ea marca și frustrarea în creștere la adresa Austro-Ungariei, după ce diplomații vienezi susținuseră cererile românești, dar și ca Bulgaria să primească Salonicul, un schimb teritorial ce ar fi avantajat guvernul de la Sofia. Apoi, nota Barclay, era marea problemă a românilor ardeleni. Era dificil ca România să pună în practică o eventuală alianță defensivă împotriva Rusiei, căci, judecând după opinia publică din țară, guvernul nu putea să-și asume un asemenea angajament¹⁷.

A șasea eroare sau „visul unei nopți de vară”. Erorile diplomației românești au fost depășite de greșelile bulgarilor. Barclay considera că Bulgaria putea „cumpăra” ieftin neutralitatea României acceptând aplicarea corectă și rapidă a înțelegerii de la St. Petersburg. Însă bulgarii au refuzat să facă propuneri clare de compensație teritorială, la fel cum Austro-Ungaria nu a insistat ca asemenea propuneri să fie înaintate. Curând, jocurile diplomatice s-au modificat radical, iar Rusia avea alte interese înaintea izbucnirii celui de-al doilea război balcanic, nedorindu-și o înțelegere între România și Bulgaria, care ar fi avut libertatea de a zdrobi Serbia¹⁸. Astfel că rușii au descurajat o înțelegere între București și Sofia, în vreme ce ambasadorul francez la București a făcut tot posibilul ca românii să mobilizeze imediat. Atacul bulgar asupra foștilor aliați sârbi și greci, fără notificare prealabilă, a fost o greșală și mai mare. Declarația de mobilizare a fost primită cu entuziasm în România, fiind momentul unor notabile agitații publice antiaustriece. În circulara trimisă puterilor pe 16 iulie, guvernul român sublinia că războiul și atacul pervers al bulgarilor confirmau pe deplin necesitatea de a obține o frontieră strategică în Dobrogea. La rândul său, atacul bulgar pleca de la alte calcule greșite, ținând de forța militară a adversarilor greci și sârbi, dar și de durata mobilizării armatei române¹⁹.

¹⁴ RAR 1912/24.

¹⁵ RAR 1913/11.

¹⁶ RAR 1913/13–14. Detalii în Nicu Pohoată, *România și Antanta în timpul conferinței de la Sankt Petersburg (martie–mai 1913)*, în „Cogito”, t. IV, nr. 2, iunie 2012 (online, pe site-ul publicației electronice, <http://cogito.ucdc.ro/arhiva.html>, accesat pe 10 februarie 2014).

¹⁷ RAR 1913/3.

¹⁸ RAR 1913/17.

¹⁹ RAR 1913/18–20. Detalii despre aspectele militare ale participării României la conflict, în lucrarea recentă a lui Constantin Olteanu, *Participarea României la cel de-al doilea război balcanic*, în „Studii și Articole de Istorie”, t. LXXX, 2013, p. 60–73.

Concluzii sau „totul e bine când se termină cu bine”. Tratatul de la București²⁰ a fost consecința faptului că bulgarii făcuseră mai multe erori diplomatice și militare decât adversarii lor. Cum nota Barclay, România ieșea din criza balcanică cu un mare profit moral și material. Câștiga aproape 8.000 km² de teritoriu, la momentul critic își arătase independența de sub influența austriacă și devenise arbitru al Balcanilor. Și toate acestea cu un preț infim. Declarația de război a României era considerată cea mai ieftină din istorie, fără a fi urmată de lupte efective, cu doar vreo 1.500 de victime provocate de holeră²¹. Războiul produsese și o schimbare semnificativă în raportarea României la problemele balcanice. Grecia, anterior antipatizată la București, era acum legată printr-un angajament diplomatic solid, ce urma să fie întărit de o alianță matrimonială²². Relații cordiale existau și cu Serbia, cu care s-au semnat mai multe convenții de colaborare.

Dincolo de aceste constatări subiective, rapoartele diplomatului britanic reprezintă o excelentă sursă primară ce documentează evoluția relațiilor diplomatice ale României cu marile puteri europene în ajunul primului război mondial, precum și perspectiva britanică asupra implicării guvernului de la București în războaiele balcanice, temă ce nu a făcut subiectul unei cercetări exhaustive în istoriografia noastră.

ANNUAL REPORT ON ROUMANIA FOR THE YEAR 1912²³

Roumania's attitude during the Balkan war

1. The mobilisation of the Balkan States at the end of September and beginning of October came as a complete surprise to the Roumanian Government. M. Kalinkof, the Bulgarian Minister, had only recently returned from leave, bringing from both King Ferdinand and M. Gueshof assurances as to the pacific intentions of the Bulgarian Government, and in an audience granted at Sinaia on the 27th September by King Charles to Mr. Bourchier, “Times” correspondent at Sophia, His Majesty ridiculed the notion that war might be imminent.

2. When communicating to the Roumanian Government the demands which the allied States had presented to Turkey, M. Kalinkof expressed the hope that they could count on Roumania's benevolent neutrality, in reply to which M. Maioresco, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, merely pointed to the fact that

²⁰ RAR 1913/27–31. Analize ale semnificației păcii de la București, în Vasile Vesa, *Pacea de la București din august 1913, o pace a puterilor mici?*, în volumul *Convergențe europene. Istorie și societate în epoca modernă*, Cluj-Napoca, 1993, p. 212–221 și Claudiu-Lucian Topor, *Pacea de la București (1913) și relațiile României cu Puterile Centrale*, în „Anuarul Institutului de Istorie «A.D. Xenopol» Iași”, t. XLII, 2005, p. 349–363.

²¹ RAR 1913/1.

²² RAR 1913/7.

²³ The National Archives of the United Kingdom, Foreign Office, Fond 81 (Confidential Print), Dosar 10161 (Roumania: Annual Report, 1912).

Roumania had not mobilised as proving her *de facto* neutrality, and, as in the case of the Italo-Turkish war, Roumania has made no declaration of neutrality in the present conflict. As regards her sympathies it may be said that so far as the Government and the army, at any rate, are concerned, they have been entirely on the side of Turkey, and in so far that the Roumanian authorities have not only not hindered, but also have done their best to conceal the passage of war material for Turkey and its shipment on board Turkish ships at Constanza, Roumania's *de facto* neutrality may be said to have been distinctly one of benevolence towards that country.

3. Early in October, when war was seen to be imminent, M. Maioresco defined the attitude of Roumania to me as follows: Roumania would keep quiet, and had no intention of mobilising, and so long as the Great Powers remained in agreement she would act in docile accord with them. Up to near the close of the year there were no signs of any inclination either on the part of King Charles or on that of his Ministers to depart from the course thus laid down. It is true that the whole period from the outbreak of the war has been marked by much activity in military preparations. It is also true that at the end of October mobilisation was loudly talked of in Bucharest. By that time, to the astonishment and disappointment of Roumanians, the fortune of war had declared itself in no uncertain fashion on the side of the allies, and it was clear that the formula of the maintenance of the territorial *status quo*, which had been used in the communication made by Austria and Russia on behalf of the Powers to the allied States, had become obsolete. The aggrandisement of Bulgaria, that nightmare of Roumanian statesmen, loomed on the near horizon, and there were unmistakable signs of discontent with the passive role Roumania was playing. But the rumours that mobilisation was impending were categorically denied by Government, and a communiqué issued to the press on the 29th October announced that the new coalition Cabinet, at a meeting the day before presided over by the King, had decided that there was no occasion for such a step. For several weeks there was no further talk of mobilisation, but latterly quite suddenly it has begun again, and this time there is every reason to think that the excitement is welcomed, if not encouraged, by Government, who feel that with the fall of Adrianople their leverage with Bulgaria would be lost, and who evidently think that a rattling of sabres is the best means of bringing the Bulgarian Government to proceed without delay with the pending negotiations for the rectification of the Dobrudja frontier. At the moment of writing the atmosphere in Bucharest is unmistakably warlike. There has been much clamour during the past few days in the press about Roumania's claims, and even Parliament has not been entirely free from bellicose utterances. Roumania's *amour-propre* is thus deeply committed, and it may be feared that a dangerous situation will arise should M. Danef and M. Misu fail to come to terms. In a recent article in "La Roumanie," M. Take Jonesco's newspaper, alluding to the settlement in principle at the informal ambassadorial meetings in London of the question of Albanian autonomy and of

Servian access to the Adriatic, it was pointed out that with the disappearance of this menace to the peace of Europe, Roumania, whose attitude, says the article, has hitherto been dictated by the desire not to contribute to the spreading of the war, will now be more free to act as demanded by her individual interests – a pronouncement the more significant as appearing in the newspaper of the Bulgarophil Minister of the Interior.

4. Roumania takes credit to herself for the pacific attitude she observed during the recent hostilities. But against this it should be said that there are some who attribute that attitude to her military unreadiness. However this may be, it is clear that a pacific attitude was the only one dictated by prudence, for she would have doubtless had to count with Russia had she moved at the outbreak of the war; still, whatever was her motive for keeping quiet the fact remains that at that time she did her part towards the localisation of the conflict. In this connection may be quoted a portion of the speech with which King Charles opened the new Parliament on the 9th December:

“In the firm desire to contribute to the localisation of the war, Roumania has observed a neutral attitude while attentively following the course of events which concern many of her interests. She has the right to expect that this attitude will have favourable results for her good relations with the Balkan States as in future constituted and that her interests will be respected. She is regarded as an important factor in the European concert and her voice will be listened to at the time of the general settlement of the questions raised by the Balkan crisis.”

5. Since that speech was delivered Roumania has abandoned her attitude of calm. How far she has forfeited her claim to rank as a peace factor in Europe will be shown by the result of the negotiations between M. Danef and M. Misu in London.

Foreign relations

General remarks

6. There has been of late a growing tendency to question the benefit that Roumania desires from her close relations with Austria. These relations are largely due to the warm personal friendship of King Charles for the Emperor Francis Joseph. King Charles is often described as his own Foreign Minister and the wisdom of his policy of close attachment to Austria has in the past, I believe, been seldom questioned by Roumanians. But lately much criticism has been heard especially from the Liberal party, and this will certainly become louder if Roumania fails to get what she is demanding from Bulgaria. Recent events in the Balkans have afforded much food for reflection, and the impending transformation in the map of Europe to the advantage of the allied Balkan States has, undoubtedly, produced a feeling of discontent. Roumania has always prided herself on standing quite apart from these States, from which she declares she is distinct both geographically and ethnologically; nevertheless, there are many today who

question whether she might not be better off figuring at the head of the Balkan States than at the tail of the European Powers. For Roumania's attitude at the time when the Balkan war was imminent, a heavy responsibility rests on King Charles. Had she then come to terms with Bulgaria her position would be much better than it is today. She could at that time have got what she wanted without even incurring the resentment of Bulgaria; now, even if she succeeds by menaces or force in extorting concessions from Bulgaria it is to be feared that she will have incurred the lasting enmity of that country; and it must be borne in mind that if ever an opportunity comes for Roumania to attempt to realise her irredentist dreams as regards Transylvania and Bukovina, Bulgaria's goodwill will be an invaluable asset.

7. An event which might exercise an important influence on the foreign relations of this country in the course of the next few years would be the marriage of either Princess Elizabeth or of Prince Carol, who are respectively 18 and 19 years old. At one time, there were rumours of the possible betrothal of the Princess to Prince Boris of Bulgaria, but it has not been talked of lately. Prince Carol is reputed to be very anglophil and, in commenting on this, the Minister for Foreign Affairs once remarked that it was a factor which should not be lost sight of in Great Britain. The fact that the future Queen of Roumania is an English Princess has not been without effect in the country, as shown by the widespread increase in the study of English amongst the younger generation, as it is considered that that language will in time become necessarily the alternative to Roumanian in court circles.

Relations with Great Britain

8. The impression prevails in Roumanian Government circles that the country is regarded with indifference and even treated with neglect by His Majesty's Government. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has mentioned the subject more than once during the year, and even King Charles has alluded to it. It is regarded as a grievance that on several occasions the legation has been left for what are deemed to be excessive periods in the hands of a chargé d'affaires. Umbrage is also taken at the fact that the British Minister is frequently left without any secretary, while the legations of other Powers have numerous staffs. M. Maioresco, in accepting the assurances that no discourtesy was intended on the part of His Majesty's Government, remarked to Mr. Vaughan last summer that Roumania was worth cultivating, as her friendship might one day prove a valuable asset for Great Britain. His Excellency also expressed regret that the alliance of the future King of Roumania with an English princess should not have been productive of a closer intimacy between the two countries.

9. In a private conversation a day or two after my arrival at the end of August, M. Maioresco again took the opportunity of urging the desirability of less indifferent relations between the two countries. I told him at the time that I was sure that it was not in any way the desire of His Majesty's Government to appear

neglectful, but I added that I thought it better not to report what he had said until longer experience of this post should have put me in a better position to judge the bearing of what he had said. M. Maioresco returned to the charge on the 3rd December, complaining in a friendly but very earnest manner of Great Britain's lack of interest in Roumania. His grievance was on the same general lines as on the two previous occasions, but he complained this time in particular that while he was well aware from conversations with my colleagues of the attitude of other Great Powers towards questions which interested Roumania, he was quite in the dark as to the British attitude, my conversations with him being for the most part confined to the exchange of compliments. I do not doubt that M. Maioresco spoke on each occasion under orders from the King. It was evident to me on the last occasion that the Roumanian Government felt very sore at our apparent neglect, and M. Maioresco expressed to me his sense of gratification at receiving on the 15th December the message from His Majesty's Government to the effect that they much appreciated Roumania's peaceful attitude through the trying time since the outbreak of the Balkan war.

10. Except for these complaints of neglect, there has been nothing to chronicle during the past year as regards the relations between the two countries. The present Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Maioresco, professes to be a great admirer of Great Britain, and as shown above he is very anxious that the most cordial relations should exist between her and Roumania. My relations with his Excellency are most friendly, though as is, perhaps, natural, I have the impression that he is less communicative with me than with representatives of other Powers who have not incurred the reproach of indifference.

Austria-Hungary

11. During the past year Austria-Hungary has been assiduous in her efforts to render still more intimate her relations with Roumania, and has neglected no opportunity of emphasising the closeness of the bond which unites the two countries. Roumania, on the other hand, while, no doubt, reciprocating the cordial feelings of the Dual Monarchy, has at times felt some embarrassment at this effusiveness from fear of giving umbrage to Russia or even to Bulgaria. This was especially noticeable in August, when the Roumanian Government found it necessary to issue to the press a communiqué refuting the insinuations contained in the "Neue Freie Presse" at the time of Count Berchtold's visit as to the existence of an alliance between the two countries. The late Count Aehrenthal was highly prized as a friend of Roumania, although, after his death the Roumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs confessed to having had some misgivings as to the lengths which his aspirations and dislike of Russia might have led him. At first M. Maioresco was doubtful as to whether his successor at the Ball Platz possessed the requisite qualifications to fill the place of so great a statesman, but since then Count Berchtold's activities have removed all doubt on this score. Great satisfaction was

caused in Roumania by the flattering allusions made to this country by Count Berchtold in his *exposé* on foreign Hungarian Delegation in the spring, but M. Maioresco remarked at the time that he hoped that Count Berchtold's friendly language would not excite jealousy or ill-feeling in Bulgaria.

12. It is customary for each newly appointed general in command of the Austro-Hungarian forces on the Roumanian frontier to pay a complimentary visit to the King of Roumania on His Majesty's arrival at Sinaia for the summer months, and on the occasion which presented itself this year the visit appears to have been marked by special cordiality. On the 22nd June General Kovess von Kovesshaza, commanding the 12th Austro-Hungarian army corps in Transylvania, accompanied by seven other generals and nine colonels, visited Sinaia. Cordial speeches were delivered at the Royal luncheon, and the two monarchs exchanged telegrams couched in warm terms. On the 1st July General von Schemera, Chief of the General Staff of the Austro-Hungarian army, also visited King Charles. Later in the same month M. Maioresco paid a visit to Vienna, and was received by the Emperor. His Excellency was the nearer of an invitation from the King and Queen of Roumania to Count and Countess Berchtold to visit their Majesties at Sinaia. This visit took place at the end of August, and, synchronising closely as it did with Count Berchtold's proposals to the Powers, great political significance was assigned to it, especially in the Vienna press, and it was then that the communiqué referred to above was issued in refutation of the insinuations in the "Neue Freie Prease" as to the two countries being allied. The communiqué, however, concluded as follows:

"L'amitié qui lie les deux Souverains et les deux pays est trop sérieuse pour qu'elle ne soit pas prête à parer aux éventualités."

In the opinion of the Minister for Foreign Affairs there was nothing to be gained by Roumania's openly identifying herself with the Triple Alliance, while such action on her part would be interpreted as a deliberate affront to Russia. In September Count Berchtold, in his *exposé* to the Hungarian Delegation, again made flattering references to Roumania. General Conrad von Hötzendorf, who was then inspector-general of the Austro-Hungarian army, visited Bucharest at the end of November. He was the bearer of an autograph letter from the Emperor Francis Joseph to King Charles, and was a guest at the palace during his visit. It was given out by the Roumanian Government that the visit was for the purpose of conveying the Emperor's condolences at the death of King Charles's sister, the Countess of Flanders, but, occurring as it did during a time of great international tension, much significance was attached to it. Whether or not, it was, as imagined by some, for the purpose of putting the finishing touches to dispositions for eventual combined military operations, it emphasised at any rate once more the close relations between the two States.

13. The ostentatious court paid by Austria to Roumania throughout the past year may perhaps be interpreted as a sign that she does not feel altogether secure as to the retention of Roumania within her orbit.

Russia

14. There has been noticeable during the past year a distinct increase in the cordiality of Roumania's relations with Russia, and there is certainly a current of opinion in this country tending to a less friendly feeling for Austria and for a more intimate friendship with Russia. Russia, on her side, has shown her desire to obliterate the resentment which Roumania has so long felt for the shabby treatment she received at the Treaty of Berlin owing to the influence of Russia.

15. On the 30th September, the fiftieth anniversary of King Charles's entry into the Russian military service, the Emperor Nicholas appointed King Charles a field-marshal in the Russian army. The telegram in which the Emperor announced this appointment to His Majesty was couched in the most cordial language, and referred in flattering terms to the part taken by Roumania in the Russo-Turkish war, and the mission in December of the Grand Duke Nicholas Michaelovitch, with a distinguished staff, to present the field-marshal's baton on the anniversary of the fall of Plevna – 11th December – was marked by warm expressions of the Emperor's friendship for King Charles, and by speeches laying stress on the excellent relations between the two countries.

16. Whatever pressure or encouragement Russia may have used on the eve of the present war to ensure Roumania's keeping quiet, she has, at any rate, not been backward in her expressions of appreciation of Roumania's pacific attitude during the past critical months. In particular, an interview given by M. Sazonof at the beginning of November to the editor of the "Ruskoye Slovo" afforded lively satisfaction here. In this interview M. Sazonof emphasised two points: (1) the European character of Roumania's policy, its pacific character meriting appreciation from the Great Powers; and (2) the need for Bulgaria to avoid creating a situation which would render it difficult for Roumania to maintain her loyal attitude to the end. In connection with this second point it should be noted that Russia was largely instrumental in the opening of the formal negotiations now proceeding in London between Roumania and Bulgaria as regards a rectification of the Dobrudja frontier, Roumania having requested Russia's mediation in this matter. Russia apparently does not consider excessive what Roumania is asking for, and she is apparently exerting strong pressure at Sophia to induce Bulgaria to come to terms with her.

France

17. Relations between Roumania and France may be classed as unimportant from a political point of view, though likely influential from the point of view of

sentiment. A very large number of Roumanians are educated in France, and in society French is as much spoken as Roumanian. In her adoption of French fashions Roumania is more Parisian than Paris.

18. In the month of April M. Paul Deschanel, the French deputy and the former president of the Chamber, and M. Félix Roussel, Mayor of Paris, visited Bucharest. They were fêted on a lavish scale and the Roumanian press contained most enthusiastic and even sentimental allusions to France, whom the "Politique," the organ of the Government, addressed as the elder sister amongst the Latin nations. The "Politique" added: "Roumania has been obliged by her geographical position to give to her policy certain fixed lines. But she loves France and she looks upon herself as the advance guard of Latin culture in this part of the world, a factor in the maintenance of the general peace so strongly and consistently desired by France".

Other Great Powers

19. I do not know that there has been anything during the period under review specially deserving of notice in Roumania's relations with the two remaining Great Powers. Nothing has occurred to mar Roumania's friendly relations with Germany. In the Italo-Turkish war Roumanian sympathies were rather on the side of Turkey than of Italy, and a certain trifling irritation against the latter country was aroused by the stopping and visiting by Italian war-ships of several Roumanian ships last summer, but the Roumanian Government treated those incidents very lightly. Indeed, so far as I know, the only occasion on which there was any suspicion of irregularity was in the case of the visit of the Roumanian steamer "Imperatul Trajan" in August, when three persons were arrested on suspicion of being Turkish officers. The Roumanian Government protested, and the Italian Government replied that they much regretted such incidents, but that nothing had been done contrary to international law. I understand that the Roumanian Government did not push their protest further, but that for the rest of the war the Italian naval authorities abstained from further visits of Roumanian vessels.

Turkey

20. Roumania's attitude during the Balkan war has at last finally disposed of the legend of the existence of a secret military convention between the two countries. How far Turkey has pressed her to assist her I do not know, but before the war broke out I know that the Porte informed the Roumanian Minister at Constantinople that Turkish troops were being concentrated near the Bulgarian frontier, ostensibly for manoeuvres, but really for purposes of intimidation, and asked that Roumania should, on her side, make some declaration which should frighten Bulgaria, a request which the Roumanian Government categorically refused. Nevertheless Roumania's sympathies, both in the Turco-Italian and the Balkan wars have been, as already mentioned, on the side of Turkey and in the latter war

her neutrality has been tinged with benevolence towards that country. Both wars have had unfortunate results for Roumanian trade as they have in a great measure stopped ships from visiting Danubian ports, so that Roumania has not been able to export her crops. It is natural, therefore, that she should have viewed with dismay the Balkan crisis, which developed at a moment when there appeared a likelihood of the peace negotiations at Lausanne breaking down. At that time King Charles gave Turkey most pressing advice to conclude peace with Italy and to detach Greece from the Balkan League by the cession of Crete. King Charles's efforts in the interests of peace on this occasion earned for him the thanks of both belligerents.

21. During the summer negotiations were being conducted at Constantinople for the conclusion of a Turco-Roumanian commercial treaty, but the internal crisis in Turkey brought them to an end without any definite results being achieved.

Bulgaria

22. At the moment of writing, the relations between Roumania and Bulgaria are causing much anxiety, and it would be rash to attempt to predict the developments in these relations which will be witnessed during the next few weeks. Of Roumania's three traditional grievances – viz., (1) the subjection to Austrian rule of the three or four million Roumanians in Bukovina and Transylvania; (2) the extortion from her by Russia, at the Treaty of Berlin, of that portion of Bessarabia given to Moldavia by the Treaty of Paris; and (3) the unsatisfactory frontier fixed by the Treaty of Berlin for the Dobrudja, which province was given them in exchange for Bessarabia – the last is naturally the one the redress of which has always seemed to be within easiest reach. There is no doubt that Roumania could have obtained a substantial rectification of frontier from Bulgaria had she given her, before the war, assurances of benevolent neutrality. Tentative overtures in this sense, I have good reason to believe, were made by Bulgaria at Sinaia Lake in September by a private emissary, but though these were at first listened to with favour by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, they were rejected after the latter had consulted King Charles, who, if rumour does not belie him, cordially dislikes Bulgarians and mistrusts King Ferdinand, and who, moreover, had no belief in the imminence of war. Another possible opportunity for obtaining favourable terms was neglected when, early in October, M. Kalinkof, the Bulgarian Minister, when communicating to M. Maioresco the demands which his allies had presented to Turkey, expressed the hope that they might count on Roumania's benevolent neutrality. The fact is, that not only did the war take the Roumanian Government by surprise, but also when its imminence was realised, they did not foresee anything but a Turkish victory, in which case the Great Powers' formula of the territorial *statu quo* would have held good; and Roumania did not feel, therefore, that she was threatened with an aggrandisement of Bulgaria.

23. When, however, at the end of October it was seen that the success of the allies was assured and that the formula of the territorial *statu quo* was obsolete, Roumania began to get restive. The Liberals blamed the Government for not having bargained with Bulgaria before the outbreak of the war. Mobilisation was talked of as a means of repairing this mistake, but King Charles and his Ministers decided against it. It was about this time, I believe, that Bulgaria was first sounded as to an arrangement for a rectification of frontier. At any rate rumours were abroad that Roumania had presented demands, and Sir Ralph Paget was informed early in November by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Belgrade that she claimed a frontier line from Turtukai on the Danube to Baltchik on the Black Sea. I have never yet been able to extract from M. Maioresco anything precise as to the line of frontier which Roumania hopes to get though the line indicated to Sir Ralph Paget tallied exactly with what I had, in conversation with Roumanians, gathered was what she hoped for. It was denied at the time both at Bucharest and at Sophia that there had been any *pourparlers*, and it is no doubt true that nothing had passed officially. If I am right in my conjecture that Bulgaria was privately sounded about this time, it was doubtless done by M. Take Jonesco through Mr. Bouchier, these two gentlemen being at the time in constant telegraphic communication. Apparently these private conversations led to no satisfactory result, for Roumania in the middle of November applied to Russia for her mediation in the matter, and it was on Russia's pressing advice that it was decided on the 15th November to send M. Danef on a special trip to Bucharest. Owing to M. Danef's being engaged in the armistice negotiations at Tchataldja there was some delay and he only reached Bucharest on the 9th December. He stayed only thirty-six hours. I do not know exactly what passed. He was accompanied by Mr. Bouchier who urged most strongly upon his friend M. Take Jonesco the danger of incurring Bulgaria's lasting enmity by taking advantage of her temporarily crippled condition to make exorbitant demands. M. Danef had an audience of the King and long interviews with M. Maioresco and with M. Take Jonesco. He was said to have made a favourable impression and to have been most conciliatory. As the Minister for Foreign Affairs put it to me, his visit had broken the ice. M. Danef, however, wished the continuation of the negotiations postponed till after his return from the Peace Conference in London but the Roumanian Government, who felt that should the Peace Conference result in the conclusion of peace they would not have the same leverage for negotiations with Bulgaria, would not hear of this, and it was finally arranged that they should continue in London where M. Danef was due on the 13th December for the Peace Conference. For some few days Bucharest remained under the favourable impression of M. Danef's visit. This favourable impression was further strengthened by the visit of two Bulgarian generals on the 11th December, in order to greet King Charles on the anniversary of Plevna. The press was loud in favour of friendly relations with Bulgaria, and it was hoped that the conversations would be resumed in London without delay; M. Misu, Roumania's ablest diplomatist, was sent at a moment's notice from Constantinople

to London in place of M. Mano in order to conduct the negotiations. M. Misu left Bucharest on the 20th December and arrived in London two days later, but it soon became known here that there was delay at Sophia in sending M. Danef his full powers to negotiate, and during the last few days of the year there has, as mentioned in an earlier portion of this report, been renewed talk of mobilisation, and the impending occupation of Silistria has been mooted even in the Chamber of Deputies. Articles hostile to Bulgaria have taken the place in the press – even in the Government organs – of the friendly utterances of a fortnight ago. The addresses to the throne from the Senate and the Chamber in reply to the King's Speech at the opening of Parliament were couched in almost menacing tones, and extraordinary military credits amounting to over 6,000,000 *l.* were demonstratively submitted to Parliament and were unanimously voted on the last day of the year. The Government deny that mobilisation is impending, but M. Maioresco in telling to this the other day added the words: "Unless Bulgaria provokes us."

24. Roumania's case has been variously stated to me, the version of M. Take Jonesco, the leader of the Conservative Democratic section of the Cabinet, differing from that of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Before summarising those two versions, I should mention that Roumanians believe, or profess to believe, that Bulgaria has irredentist aspirations in regard to the Dobrudja, and in proof of this they adduce a map, which is alleged to have been circulated amongst the Bulgarian troops, showing Dobrudja as part of still unconquered Bulgarian territory. If such a belief really prevails in Roumania, it is natural that the aggrandisement of Bulgaria should be not merely a source of jealousy, but a source of genuine alarm, and that Roumania should make every effort to protect herself from the danger she believes to threaten her. As regards the views of M. Maioresco and M. Take Jonesco of Roumania's rights, as stated to me, these may be briefly summarised as follows: M. Take Jonesco urges that Roumania is entitled to compensation from Bulgaria because Roumanian neutrality alone made possible the successes of the allied armies, and because, owing to the impending territorial changes in the peninsula, Roumania must inevitably, as time goes on, lose her hold on the Koutzo-Vlachs. On the other hand, M. Maioresco is always most emphatic in denying that Roumania is asking for compensation for her neutrality during the recent hostilities; his argument is apparently as follows: Notwithstanding the declarations of the allies previous to the war disclaiming all territorial aims, their frontiers fixed by the Treaty of Berlin are about to undergo revision, and therefore Roumania, whose frontier was also fixed by that treaty, and fixed in a manner to which she raised the strongest objection at the time, is also entitled to revision. These grounds may be convincing to Roumanians, but it is to be feared that they will not prove so to Bulgaria, who well knows that it is not for her *beaux yeux* that Roumania has so far remained neutral, and who can point to the fact that she herself had no reason to be specially content with the Treaty of Berlin, which deprived her of so much which had been given her by the Treaty of San Stefano.

25. As has already been remarked in an earlier portion of this report, the handling of Roumania's relations with Bulgaria at the time of the outbreak of the war has been much criticised by the Liberal party. In this connection it may not be out of place to point out that Roumania's initial mistake was made when the Liberal party was in office, for there is no doubt that the hostility shown by Russia to Roumania at the time of the Treaty of Berlin, and in the negotiations which followed for the delimitation of the Dobrudja frontier fixed by that treaty, was due to her resentment of Roumania's uncompromising attitude in the matter of the recovery by Russia, in exchange for the Dobrudja, of that part of Bessarabia which had been given to Moldavia by the Treaty of Paris. Had M. Bratiano, the Liberal leader, shown at that time a less unbending spirit, there can be no doubt that Roumania would have obtained far more than she is asking for today.

26. Long before this report is printed it will doubtless be known precisely what are Roumania's present demands and how far Bulgaria is prepared to go towards satisfying them. At the moment of writing I have no reason to doubt that the frontier demanded is that mentioned earlier in this report, i.e., a line from Turkhai, on the Danube, to Baltchik, on the Black Sea, though no doubt Roumania would content herself with less provided she acquires Silistria. She is, it appears from a telegram just received from Sophia, apparently prepared, in exchange for territorial concessions, to offer to join the allies against Turkey. This might prove a very substantial *quid pro quo*, and would seem to offer the best chance of Roumania's obtaining her territorial compensation without incurring Bulgaria's lasting enmity. There is also the question of the treatment of the Koutzo-Vlachs, whose numbers in European Turkey are variously estimated at anything from 400,000 to 1,200,000, the latter figure being certainly greatly exaggerated. For years past the Roumanian Government has been spending money on these people; at least 30,000,000 fr. are said to have gone to the upkeep of their school and churches, but the utterances of the Government and in the press on this question, and the popular demonstrations that have lately been a feature in Bucharest, have always struck me as not entirely sincere, and one cannot but feel that the interest of the country in these people has been fostered in large measure in order to give Roumania a pretext for more practical demands whenever the general liquidation should come. In any case, the question of the treatment of the Koutzo-Vlachs does not seem likely in itself to give rise to difficulties as far as Bulgaria is concerned; for I understand that Bulgaria is quite prepared to give those residing in the territories assigned to her episcopal and educational autonomy.

Greece

27. Until the outbreak of the Balkan war the year 1912 had proved singularly from "incidents" between this country and Greece, and there can be no doubt that, this satisfactory result was largely to the tact and conciliatory attitude of the Greek representative in Bucharest, M. Carusso. He made it known that he would not take

up any doubtful cases, but his action, though approved by Greeks of standing in Roumania, procured him many enemies among his intriguing countrymen in this country and in the more chauvinistic circles in Athens, and ultimately led to his recall. In the course of the war incidents have occurred which have revived the anti-Greek feeling in Roumania. A short time ago, on the arrival of the Roumanian steamer "Dacia," bound from Alexandria to the Pireus, six of her passengers, suspected of being Turkish officers, were arrested and removed by the Greek authorities. Owing to this incident it was decided that the Roumanian mail-steamers should for a time suspend calling at Greek ports. Since then anti-Greek feeling has been aggravated by reports which have reached Roumania of the persecution of the Koutzo-Vlachs in the districts occupied by Greek troops. Quite recently, on the 1st December, a public meeting in Bucharest, held to protest against the persecution of these people, was followed by an attempt at a hostile demonstration before the Greek Legation, which was, however, foiled by the police.

28. Roumania's relations with the other States which have representatives in Bucharest – America, Spain, Belgium, Holland, Persia and Servia do not call for special comment, except that as regards the last named country, it should be mentioned that the position of the Koutzo-Vlachs in Albania has recently been given great prominence by the Roumanian Government and press, and it is clear that Roumania will strive to make her voice heard when it comes to considering the boundaries of an autonomous Albania, a question which so closely affects Servia, and although Roumania has not, as she hoped, and as was suggested by Austria and Germany, been given a place in the ambassadorial meetings in London, she has been given to understand that she will be consulted when matters which concern her are under discussion. The delimitation of Albania will doubtless come up shortly for discussion, and this is a question which Roumania thinks, or at any rate professes to think, concerns her very nearly.

ANNUAL REPORT ON ROUMANIA FOR THE YEAR 1913²⁴

General Survey of Foreign Relations

1. The Speech from the Throne at the opening of the Roumanian Parliament in December 1912, closed with the words, "Roumania's voice will be listened to at the time of the final settlement of the questions raised by the Balkan crisis." Thanks to favouring circumstances, and above all to Bulgaria's folly, these words of King Charles have received during the year under review more ample fulfilment than could have been imagined at the time they were uttered, by even the most sanguine, and Roumania has emerged from the Balkan crisis with much profit, moral and material. She has acquired nearly 8,000 square kilom. of new territory;

²⁴ *Ibidem*, FO 881/10421 (Roumania: Annual Report, 1913).

she has, at a critical juncture, asserted her independence of Austrian influence, and has become in great measure the arbiter of the Balkans, thus extinguishing for a time at any rate Bulgaria's chance of achieving the hegemony to which she aspired. And all this at comparatively trilling cost. As the "Times," I think, put it, Roumania's declaration of war on the 10th July was perhaps the cheapest on record. There was no fighting, and practically the only casualties among the troops were the deaths from cholera amounting to some 1,500.

2. Before proceeding to the narrative of events during the year, I would briefly touch on the present state of Roumania's foreign relations as I see them.

Austria

3. On the 8th July, Sir F. Cartwright reported that he had heard that the Emperor Francis Joseph had commanded Count Berchtold to concentrate his efforts on retaining the friendship of Roumania, and since her blunder in making the abortive reserves as regards the revision of the Treaty of Bucharest, Austria has sought to make up lost ground by a liberal bestowal of orders on members of the Roumanian Royal Family, and by appointing, as her Minister at this Court, Count Ottokar Czernin, who should prove a *persona grata* here, as he is known to be in favour of more liberal treatment for the Roumanians in Transylvania. Nevertheless, there is a very bitter feeling in this country against her, and Count Czernin will find it difficult to combat it. It is felt that during Roumania's negotiations with Bulgaria in the winter, Austria did not champion Roumania's cause with sufficient vigour at Sophia, and though it is known that at the meeting of the Ambassadors at St. Petersburg she worked to obtain for Roumania more than Silistria, it is also known that she proposed at those meetings that Bulgaria should be given Salonica as compensation, an arrangement which would have been in the highest degree unpalatable to Roumania as it would have so greatly strengthened her rival. The Austrian pronouncement in regard to the revision of the Treaty of Bucharest did not improve matters, and besides these grievances, there is the chronic sore of the treatment by Hungary of the Roumanians in Transylvania. Of course, Austria has an important asset in the friendship of King Charles for the Emperor Francis Joseph, which leads those in power in Bucharest to do their utmost to smoothe matters, and while this asset remains it would be difficult for Roumania to denounce that defensive alliance against Russia the existence of which Russians suspect, though, judging from the present trend of public feeling in Roumania, one hardly sees how, if the *casus foederis* arose, the Roumanian Government could carry out any engagement of the kind.

Russia

4. With Russia Roumania's relations have improved during the year. The sincerity and rigour of the Russian representations at Sophia on Roumania's behalf, during the Roumanian and Bulgarian negotiation last winter, have never been

questioned, and Roumania has viewed with an indulgent eye Russia's attitude not only at the meetings of the Ambassadors at St. Petersburg but also her attitude in regard to the revision of the Treaty of Bucharest, the requirements of her position as a great Slav Power being fully realised. Roumania is grateful to Russia for having only acquiesced in, but even approved her action in the summer. One hears little talk nowadays of Bessarabia, and altogether things look promising for the relations between the two Powers. The Emperor has intimated to King Charles that prince Carol would be a welcome suitor for the hand of one of the grand duchesses, and I am told that M. Diamandi, the Roumanian Minister at St. Petersburg, is just now being treated in that capital with very special consideration.

France, Germany, and Italy

5. With France Roumania's relations, always good, are warmer and more friendly than ever. Roumania is grateful for the favourable view taken by that country of her intervention last summer, which France rightly regarded as a powerful factor for the prompt restoration of peace, and also for her opposition to the revision of the Treaty of Bucharest. Germany, too, by a similar attitude in regard to revision earned her gratitude, which found expression in a telegram after the peace from King Charles to the Emperor, which contained the phrase, "Thanks to your Majesty the treaty remains definitive." Roumania's relations with Germany are of the friendliest character, and there is even talk of the Emperor, who has not always been on the best of terms with King Charles, visiting Bucharest this year. The slight coolness between Roumania and Italy arising out of the Italo-Turkish war has worn off, and relations are now very good. Prince Carol visited Italy in the spring, and was accorded a most cordial reception, which elicited a chorus of exuberant appreciation from the Roumanian press, which saw in the honour and attentions bestowed upon Prince Carol the inauguration of an era of close friendship between the two kindred nations for their mutual benefit, political and commercial. Prince Carol's visit was followed by an order for four torpedo-destroyers from Messrs. Pattison, at Naples.

Great Britain

6. The scathing utterances of many of the London papers last summer with regard to Roumania's treatment of Bulgaria, though resented at the time, have, so far as I can see, left no rancour against Great Britain, and except for this nothing has happened to mar the relations between the two countries. M. Maioresco, for some reason which was not clear to me, as he listened with apparent equanimity to much more pressing advice from others, evinced a good deal of annoyance when, in obedience to instructions, I counselled moderation in January, but he was sincerely grateful for the advice from the Powers, in the following month, initiated by Great Britain, to have recourse to mediation for a settlement of Roumania's differences with Bulgaria. I may mention another instance where our representations

bore fruit. In September the Netherlands invited Roumania to adhere to the Opium Convention. The invitation was supported at the time by America, Germany, Italy and Russia, but Roumania's reply was an almost categorical refusal. It was only at the end of October that I was instructed to support The Hague invitation. My representations were received in a most amenable spirit, and Roumania has now adhered to the convention.

Balkan States

7. The developments of the Balkan crisis in the summer have thrown Greece and Roumania together, and Greece, until recently disliked and despised by the Roumanians, is now bound to Roumania by an agreement concluded after the conference here between Roumania, Greece, Servia and Montenegro, guaranteeing as against Bulgaria the maintenance of the Treaty of Bucharest. At the time of the conference M. Venizelos made the most favourable impression amongst all in authority here, and the mutual confidence engendered at that time was perhaps not without influence at the time of M. Take Jonesco's visit to Athens in November, when his efforts at mediation between Turkey and Greece produced such a happy result. The standing grievance that Roumania has had against Greece, that of the treatment of the Koutzo-Vlachs by the Greek bands has now disappeared, and Greece has bound herself (as mentioned below) to accord her Koutzo Vlach subjects ecclesiastical and educational autonomy. It seems probable that the excellent relations now existing between the two countries will before long be cemented by a matrimonial alliance between the two Royal Families. The Crown Prince of Greece is expected in Bucharest shortly, the object of his visit being that he should make the acquaintance of Princess Elizabeth of Roumania. With Servia Roumania's relations have always been good. Neither country covets the other's territory, and both have similar irredentist dreams which may lead in the future, in the event of trouble befalling Austria, to important developments. For the present, however, and until the death of King Charles or his lifelong friend the Emperor Francis Joseph, it seems doubtful whether Roumania will bind herself more closely to Servia than she has already done. Since the conference at Bucharest, besides the agreement already mentioned, Servia has signed two agreements with Roumania, one, a postal convention, stipulating for inland rates between the two countries for telegrams and letters, and another providing for the linking up of the Roumanian and Servian railway systems by a bridge over the Danube joining Barza Palanka on the Servian bank, and Tziza Noshi in Roumania, 16 miles above Gruia. As regards Bulgaria her relations with Roumania are as good as could be expected after recent events. M. Radef, the new Bulgarian Minister, is liked here, though he perhaps protests too much, endeavouring to spread the belief that Bulgaria will let bygones be bygones. For all his protestations, Roumania intends to keep her powder dry.

8. The question of special interest for the moment in the relations of the two countries is whether, if Bulgaria allowed the passage of Turkish troops through

Thrace against Greece, it would be a *casus foederis* under Roumania's agreement with Greece and Servia concluded at the time of the conference at Bucharest. I am inclined to think that Roumania would not treat this merely passive assistance to Turkey as a *casus belli*, and I have reported in this sense more than once.²⁵

Roumano-Bulgarian frontier Dispute

9. It will be remembered that when M. Danef passed through Bucharest, in the middle of December, 1912, on his way to take part in the abortive Balkan Peace Conference in London, it had been arranged that the conversations opened in Bucharest by the Bulgarian Government, at the prompting of Russia and Austria, with a view to a rectification of frontier for Roumania and to obtaining guarantees for the treatment of the Koutzo-Vlachs in Macedonia should be continued in London between M. Danef and M. Misu, the latter of whom had recently replaced M. Mano at the legation in London, as specially conversant with the Eastern Question. M. Danef's arrival in London did nothing, however, to advance matters. For a fortnight he declared himself without instructions and when they came, his offer as regards territorial concessions which he made on the 3rd January to M. Misu and M. Take Jonosco, the latter of whom had arrived in London to take an unofficial hand in the negotiations, was quite inadequate, and merely conceded the two triangles which extending northwards break the straight line of the frontier fixed by the Treaty of Berlin. A few days later M. Danef announced that he would not continue the negotiations because when passing through Paris M. Take Jonosco had told M. Poincaré that M. Danef had committed himself while in Bucharest. At this the Roumanian Government were fairly exasperated. Time was passing and they felt that any moment Adrianople might fall or peace be concluded when they would lose their leverage. M. Maioresco was not appeased by certain proposals made by M. Schebeko, the Russian Minister, on behalf of the Bulgarian Government on the 8th January:

- (1) Ecclesiastical and educational autonomy for the Koutzo Vlachs;
- (2) The dismantling of the fortifications of Silistria and the cession of the strategic position of Medjidie Taba;
- (3) A slight rectification of frontier giving Roumania some twenty villages;
- (4) Guarantees that Bulgaria had no irredentist designs on the Dobrudja.

M. Maioresco expressed annoyance at Russia's interference at a moment when there was no question of mediation or arbitration. He complained of M. Danef's methods of negotiation and declared – a declaration which he afterwards repeated to Prince Fürstenberg, the Austrian Minister – that unless M. Danef resumed the negotiations in London, Roumania would occupy the territory she claimed from Bulgaria. By this time, however, it was realised at Sophia that matters were serious

²⁵ Since I wrote the above my opinion expressed above has been proved to be, now, at any rate, incorrect for the new Cabinet has made it quite clear at Sophia, and, I believe, at Constantinople, that Romania could not remain indifferent in such an eventuality.

and M. Danef was instructed to resume negotiations. M. Maioresco informed M. Schebeko of this and added that farther intervention on Russia's part was in these circumstances unnecessary. But even now things in London did not improve. Complaints were loud in Bucharest that M. Misu could get nothing definite out of M. Danef, and this though Roumania was offering Bulgaria assistance in money and also, it is believed, in troops. At a Cabinet Council on the 25th January some of the Ministers pronounced themselves in favour of immediate military action. The warlike members of the Ministry, however, were overruled and it was decided to do no more for the moment than to insist on M. Danef's recording in a *process-verbal* the last word of what Bulgaria was prepared to give. Instructions in this sense were sent to M. Misu, who was told that Roumania's minimum demand was the line from Silistria to Baltchik, both inclusive; if M. Danef offered this, M. Misu was to accept, if not, he was to record his dissent in the *procès-verbal*, leaving a settlement for later. In the protocol of the 29th January resulting from these instructions Roumania took act of a declaration made in the course of the negotiations that Bulgaria consented to grant ecclesiastical and educational autonomy for the Koutzo Vlachs, and stated his territorial demand as a frontier running from west of Turtukai to Baltchik on the Black Sea. On the other hand Bulgaria offered to dismantle the fortifications of Silistria and to cede the two triangles and a strip of some 5 or 6 kilom. on the coast of the Black Sea.

10. The signature of this protocol marked the close of the London negotiations. M. Danef left London, where, after Enver Bey's *coup d'État* at Constantinople, the Balkan Peace Conference had broken down, and it was decided to continue the negotiations at Sophia, where Prince Ghika, the Roumanian Minister, was instructed to insist on the line from Silistria to Baltchik as Roumania's minimum. Bulgaria's reply delivered to Prince Ghika, by the Bulgarian delegates, M. Danef and M. Saraffof, at the sitting of the 15th February, though it showed some slight advance on her terms as embodied in the London protocol in that it ceded Medjidie Taba and somewhat increased the strip of territory on the Black Sea, was very far from what Roumania demanded, and Prince Ghika made it clear that if it was Bulgaria's last word it meant the breakdown of the negotiations. Thus ended the negotiations between Roumania and Bulgaria. The Powers were now to try their hand at a settlement.

11. A section of the Cabinet, supported by M. Carp and other prominent Conservatives outside the Cabinet, were clamouring for the immediate occupation of the territory claimed, while the King and M. Maioresco and the Conservative Democrat members of the Ministry were known to favour recourse to the mediation of one or all of the Great Powers. Advice given in this latter sense by His Majesty's Government on the 14th February, supported as it was on the following days by all the other Great Powers, came therefore very opportunely. It was immediately taken into favourable consideration by M. Maioresco, who, with King Charles's support, pushed it through the Cabinet and was able to inform the

legations on the 22nd of February that Roumania accepted the Powers advice, though he was careful to cite articles 3 to 7 of The Hague Convention as defining the non-binding character of the mediators' recommendations. But now some confusion arose, as the instructions to advise mediation were closely followed by instructions to some of the representatives in Bucharest to advise the Roumanian Government to leave the decision to the Great Powers, this latter instruction pointing rather to arbitration than mediation. Both sets of instructions, that in respect of mediation and that in respect of arbitration, had also been sent to Sophia; but whereas the later instructions had not reached all the representatives in Bucharest before the mediation proposals had been accepted – it was doubtless because M. Maioresco had got wind of the arbitration proposals that he had made such haste to accept the more palatable mediation proposals – this was not the case at Sophia, where the advice to leave a settlement to the decision of the Powers was duly tendered to and accepted by the Bulgarian Government. It was clear that to bring the two Governments into line a supplementary representation must be made at one or the other capital, and knowing how difficult it would be for M. Maioresco to induce his colleagues to agree to submit to arbitration, the representatives at Bucharest advised their Governments to make the necessary amending representation at Sophia and to urge Bulgaria to accept mediation. The representatives were, however, overruled in London, and instructed to inform the Roumanian Government of Bulgaria's answer to the Powers' advice, and to enquire whether Roumania was also prepared to submit to their decision. This enquiry was made on the 2nd March by the French Minister, the doyen, and elicited the reply that the Roumanian Government could not go back on their decision; that, indeed, to do so would be dangerous to the cause of peace which the Powers had at heart, for if the Cabinet did what was asked, it would probably fall and be succeeded by one which would certainly be less pacific. His Excellency, however, gave the representatives his personal and secret guarantee that the proposals eventually formulated by the Powers, whatever they might be, would be respected by the Roumanians. This secret assurance of M. Maioresco practically removed the divergence between the modes of settlement accepted respectively at Sophia and Bucharest. Both Governments expressed the desire that the mediation proceedings should take place at St. Petersburg, M. Maioresco being careful to explain to me that this was not through lack of consideration for London but because it was thought that the Ambassadors in London had enough troublesome questions to deal with already. It will be remembered that many of the leading papers in England were anything but flattering to Roumania at this time, a fact which doubtless had something to do with M. Maioresco's preference for St. Petersburg.

12. Roumania's case for mediation was presented in a memorandum to the Powers early in March. After recalling the part taken by Roumania in the war of 1877–78, the Roumanian memorandum pointed out that she had for a second time merited Bulgaria's gratitude by her neutral attitude in the Balkan war, an attitude

which was natural so long as the Great Powers adhered to their principle of the maintenance of the territorial *status quo*, but now that by their abandonment of that principle and the adoption of the formula “the Balkans for the Balkan States,” they had driven a coach and four through the Treaty of Berlin, Roumania, whose interest in the Balkans was recognised by that treaty, was entitled to a revision of her position. She now claimed (1) special treatment for the Koutzo-Vlachs of Macedonia, who under Turkish rule had enjoyed protection and had been treated as a separate community, and (2) such rectification of her frontier as would give her a line running from some miles west of Silistria to the Black Sea at Baltchik. The present worthless frontier had been forced upon her at the Treaty of Berlin. Silistria dominated the Roumanian Dobrudja, and in view of the irredentist feeling in the Bulgarian army, which was taught to regard the Dobrudja as still unfreed Bulgaria, constituted a constant danger to Roumania, whereas in Roumania’s hands it was exclusively a defensive post. Roumania also needed a stretch of coast as far as and including Baltchik, a military post being needed to protect Constanza, and Mangalia being too near to the present frontier to be so used. The memorandum explained the difference between Roumania’s present demand – a line from Silistria to Baltchik – and what she had asked for in London – a line from Turtukai to Baltchik – as being due to the fact, that the latter was put forward at a time when Bulgaria had expressed her ardent desire for a thoroughly comprehensive arrangement which should guarantee the interest and the dignity of the two States. This proposal seemed to foreshadow demands from Bulgaria, and it was in expectation of this that Roumania had formulated her maximum claim.

13. At the meetings of the Ambassadors at St. Petersburg, which opened on the 1st April, the Triple Alliance Powers, as was to be expected, championed Roumania’s cause, while those of the *entente* were for letting Bulgaria off as lightly as possible. The protocol embodying the proposals to be made to the two Powers was signed on the 17th April. The terms were briefly as follows: Roumania was to get Silistria and the country round it for a zone of 3 kilom., and was to indemnify the Bulgarian subjects residing in the annexed district who desired to leave it. Bulgaria was to construct no fortifications along the frontier from the Danube to the Black Sea. The Koutzo-Vlachs were to be given ecclesiastical and educational autonomy, Bulgaria allowing the creation of a Koutzo Vlach bishopric and subventions from Roumania for the schools. The tracing of the frontier, the amount of the indemnity to the Bulgarian inhabitants of Silistria who wished to leave that town, and the limits of the districts within which Bulgaria was to erect no fortifications were to be fixed by a mixed Roumanian-Bulgarian commission, assisted, if necessary, by experts to be named by the mediating Powers.

14. Although it had been agreed that the result of the St. Petersburg meetings are not to be announced till preliminaries of peace had been signed by Turkey and the Balkan allies, the terms of the protocol soon became known in Bucharest, and a noisy agitation was started against their acceptance. The most

warlike member of the Cabinet, M. Filipesco, had already resigned, and he and M. Carp, the late leader of the Conservative party, held meetings to call upon Parliament to reject the proposals of the Powers, but though these meetings were attended by many of the Conservative senators and deputies they stood firmly by M. Maioresco, and when the protocol was submitted to Parliament, it was accepted with practical unanimity, the leader of the liberals, however, making it plain that his party in voting with the Government did not imply that they approved the Government's conduct of affairs during the Balkan crisis, and the speeches in the debate making it abundantly clear that all parties regarded the solution as not necessarily final. A retort by M. Maioresco during the debate to something said by M. Bratiano when complaining of the Government's inaction in the autumn of 1912 indicates what was thought of the outlook at the time by the Prime Minister. M. Bratiano complained that Roumania "had missed her train," and M. Maioresco replied that "Roumania's train is now coming."

15. Roumania notified her acceptance of the St. Petersburg protocol to the Powers on the 5th June in a circular which foreshadowed her subsequent course. She said that she had at once ordered the execution of the arrangement though it did not entirely satisfy his expectations. Roumania had thus given a fresh proof of her desire to act so far as her interests permitted, in harmony with the Great Powers. She had been a decisive factor in the localisation of the war, but dissensions seemed to have suddenly manifested themselves amongst the allies in regard to the partition of their conquests. These questions affected the recognised interests of Roumania, and she could not remain indifferent to an eventual aggravation of the situation in the Balkans. She hoped that peace would be promptly assured, but, if her hopes were disappointed she could not persevere in the attitude of reserve she had hitherto observed.

16. The Mixed Commission for the tracing of the frontier according to the St. Petersburg protocol got to work at Silistria at the middle of June and it was from the first evident that there would be difficulties over the question where the zone of 8 kilom. round Silistria was to be measured from. However, the point soon lost its importance for the moment had now come when Bulgaria was to have forced from her much more than Silistria and its 8 kilom. zone.

17. Already as early as March the King of Greece in taking leave of the outgoing Roumanian Minister had spoken of the possibility of an agreement with Roumania against Bulgaria, and at the beginning of April the Servian Minister at Bucharest had sounded M. Maioresco in the same sense. The latter had replied evasively as he did also later when approached by the Greek Minister early in June, but in the face of the warning contained in the circular to the Powers by which Roumania had announced her acceptance of the St. Petersburg protocol no one should have been in any doubt that unless Bulgaria came to terms with her, Roumania would mobilise against her as soon as war broke out between the former allies. Indeed the foolhardiness of Bulgaria's attitude during the three weeks

preceding the war was truly amazing. She was well served by M. Kalinkof, her Minister in Bucharest, and cannot have been ignorant either that Roumania was in earnest or that Russia would not prevent her from moving. Bulgaria could, I believe, despite Roumania's threats of mobilisation with a view to maintaining the balance of powers in the Balkans, have bought Roumania up to the very day the latter's mobilisation was decreed, by ceding the territory in dispute; and yet during the whole of the three weeks preceding the war, she did not so far as I know make any definite proposals to Roumania. It is true that M. Danef enquired of Prince Ghika on the 18th June as to the force of Roumania's neutrality but this was not enough, what Roumania wanted, Prince Ghika replied, was a definite proposal and if war broke out she would mobilise. It is indeed strange that Austria failed to induce her to make these definite proposals. Russia's object was of course different. The last thing she wanted was that Bulgaria by coming to terms with Roumania should be left free to crush Servia and from the moment a conflict threatened between the allies M. Schebeko did his best to discourage any arrangement between Roumania and Bulgaria. He did not, I believe, expressly advise Roumania to mobilise, though the French Minister, when once Roumania had announced her determination to mobilise in the event of the outbreak of war did all he could, doubtless with M. Schebeko's approval, to induce the Government not to wait until war had broken out but to mobilise at once.

Second Balkan War

18. Partial mobilisation was ordered on the 13th June but countermanded on the King's learning of the Emperor of Russia's telegrams to the Kings of Bulgaria and Servia. On the 30th June news reached Bucharest that the Bulgarians had taken the offensive attacking both the Servians and Greeks in force, and after enquiring at Sophia, Belgrade, and Athens whether the respective Governments considered their countries at war and receiving affirmative replies from Belgrade and Athens it was decided to mobilise forthwith and the decree was signed on the 3rd July. The announcement in Bucharest of the signature of the decree was enthusiastically received and was made the occasion for a somewhat startling display of anti-Austrian feeling in Bucharest. Crowds paraded the leading streets and even took up their stations in front of the palace with banners bearing the legend "Down with perfidious Austria," and it was thought necessary to place a guard at the Austrian Legation. It had been evident for some time that Austria had been losing ground here. As has been already stated it was felt that she had not pressed at Sophia on Roumanians behalf with anything like the vigour shown by Russia, and her efforts at the meetings of the Ambassadors at St. Petersburg to secure better terms for Roumania met with scant recognition; but Prince Fürstenberg must have been disagreeably surprised by the popular demonstrations which made it evident how profoundly unpopular the policy of saying ditto to Austria had become.

19. Roumania declared war on the 10th July, reminding the Bulgarian Government of the warning given them and stating that war had begun by Bulgaria's suddenly attacking Servian troops without regard to international usage, which prescribed previous ratification. Prince Ghika left Sophia after delivering this note and placing Roumanian interests in Italy's hands. M. Kalinkof the Bulgarian Minister here lingered till the 13th when the Roumanian Government sent him his passport. On the 16th Roumania addressed a circular to the Powers explaining her action; it was to the following effect: in invading Bulgaria Roumania was pursuing no policy of conquest, nor did she aim at crushing the Bulgarian army. Her military action was dictated, in the first place, by the necessity of obtaining forthwith, for her territory across the Danube, an assured frontier.

20. The present conflict between the Balkan States and above all the origin of this conflict, which arose from the stubbornness of the Bulgarian Government and from its having attacked its former allies, had confirmed the Roumanian Government in its conviction that a strategic frontier was indispensable in order to render possible peaceful relations between the two States in the future. The frontier desired was a line giving to Roumania, Turtukai, Dobritch, and Baltchik with a few kilometres of territory to the west and south of these places as dictated by the conformation of the territory.

21. Besides this, the essential interests of Roumania in the Balkan Peninsula prevented her from remaining a mere spectator in the face of the manifest designs of Bulgaria which aimed at the hegemony of the Balkans. It was the duty of Roumania as a constant element of order and peace in the east of Europe to participate in the final settlement of a question which had too long threatened her own gates, and finally had disturbed the general peace and in acting as she was acting, with a view to reaching a definitive arrangement between the belligerents Roumania considered that she was not only helping to assure the legitimate interests of the parties whose cause was directly at stake but that she was also seconding the efforts of the Great Powers in the cause of peace.

22. By this time Bulgaria was in truly desperate case. She had miscalculated not only the strength of the Greeks and Servians, but also the time that the Roumanian mobilisation would take, and she had doubtless hoped to defeat the Greeks and Servians before the Roumanians had obtained any considerable footing in Bulgaria. But as a matter of fact, by the 9th July she was defeated all along the line, and the Roumanian mobilisation was almost complete. In her desperate plight she put her case unreservedly in Russia's hands, and on the 14th July M. Schebeko made on behalf of the Bulgarian Government a formal offer of the Turtukai – Baltchik line, at the same time urging that the Roumanian troops should confine their action to the occupation of that line. But by this time things had gone too far, for not only had Roumania occupied Silistria on the 11th July with troops from the Dobrudja, but all the necessary preparations for crossing the Danube had been completed, and the troops began to cross at Corabbia on the 15th July. On the

following day M. Schebeko, this time supported by M. Blondel, the French Minister, again urged that the advance of the troops should be stopped, M. Schebeko at the same time making it clear that the Turtukai – Baltchik line already offered included the important town of Dobritch. M. Schebeko and M. Blondel were assured in reply that, however far the troops advanced, Roumania would only insist on two things – the Turtukai – Dobritch – Baltchik line, with a few kilometres to the west and south demanded by the configuration of the ground and participation in the Peace Conference, which M. Maioresco suggested should be held at Bucharest or Sinaia.

23. By this time the Gueschof Ministry at Sophia had fallen and given place to a Cabinet presided over by the Stamboulouphist M. Ghenadief. The new Ministry abandoned the Russian channel of communication, and communicated with the Roumanian Government through the Italian Legations at the two capitals. This annoyed M. Schebeko, and for a time he ceased from pressing further for the stoppage of the Roumanian advance. On the 19th the Italian Minister, on behalf of the Bulgarian Government, offered the Turtukai – Baltchik line, and begged in return Roumania's benevolent neutrality and her aid and support for the pacific settlement of Bulgaria's difficulties with Greece and Servia, and above all for the immediate recall of the troops, to which Roumania replied, pointing out that the offer of the Turtukai – Baltchik line had already been made officially by Russia in the name of Bulgaria in more precise form than the offer now made, as it expressly gave Dobritch to Roumania. Roumania had taken act of the offer made by Russia, and as regards the demand that Roumania should stop her advance and withdraw her troops, this could not be considered, as Roumania had advanced her troops in order to accelerate the conclusion of peace between all the belligerents. If Bulgaria also desired the prompt conclusion of peace, she should at once inform Roumania and name her plenipotentiaries for the discussion of preliminaries of peace with all the belligerents, and in this discussion Roumania would exert herself in a spirit of conciliation and impartiality.

24. Bulgaria's rejoinder to this message declared that the proposals she had made with a view to resuming friendly relations had not been made with the object of continuing the war with Greece and Servia. On the contrary, Bulgaria was firmly decided speedily to conclude peace with the two countries. She had already formally accepted a proposal from Russia that she should send delegates to negotiate peace and these had already left for Servia. She was ready for an immediate cessation of hostilities, provided Greece and Servia on their side would suspend fighting, and she again begged that the advance of the Roumanian troops should be arrested. The negotiation which passed through the Italian Legations were immediately followed by a direct exchange of telegrams between M. Ghenadief and M. Maioresco in which

(1) The former asked M. Maioresco to appoint peace plenipotentiaries, and to name a place for the discussion of peace preliminaries;

(2) M. Maioresco replied, recording in explicit terms what he considered as already conceded to Roumania by Bulgaria and as needing no further discussion, and leaving the place for the discussion of the terms of a suspension of hostilities to Greece and Servia, the Peace Conference to be at Bucharest; and

(3) M. Ghenadief accepted in principle M. Maioresco's statement of what Bulgaria had conceded, and agreed to Bucharest for the discussion of peace preliminaries, an armistice to be arranged at Nish.

25. Concurrently with these negotiations a number of telegrams were sent by King Ferdinand to King Charles imploring him to stay the advance of the troops, and repeating the assurances of his Government that he urgently desired peace, not only with Roumania but also with Greece and Servia.

26. With Bulgaria on her knees there was no need for any farther advance of the Roumanian troops, who were now within easy march of Sophia, and on the 21st July the Bulgarian Government was formally assured that the troops would not emerge from the passes leading into the Sophia plain.

Peace Preliminaries

27. On M. Maioresco's sounding the Greek and Servian Governments as to the Peace Conference being held at Bucharest, Greece, while agreeing to Bucharest for the signature of the treaty of peace, insisted on peace preliminaries being signed "on the field of battle," i.e., that the discussion of peace preliminaries was not to be preceded by a suspension of hostilities; both were to be signed simultaneously at Nish. This proposal did not suit M. Maioresco, who wished the discussion of the terms of peace to take place at Bucharest, as he felt that if it was at Nish, there was more chance of the treaties having to be revised by the Powers than if the terms of peace were discussed at Bucharest, where the delegates would be in touch with the representatives of the Great Powers. Greece, however, while she no longer insisted on preliminaries of peace being signed at Nish, held out, notwithstanding some pressure from the Powers, for the simultaneous signature of the armistice and preliminaries of peace. The meeting of delegates at Nish, where some of them had already arrived, was therefore abandoned. Formal invitations were issued to Belgrade, Athens, Cetinje and Sophia to attend the Peace Conference at Bucharest, and the three Prime Ministers of Greece, Montenegro, and Servia, and M. Tontchef from Sophia started forthwith for Bucharest.

28. Immediately on M. Venizelos's arrival at Bucharest he announced his willingness that a brief suspension of arms should be arranged at once. He had doubtless had bad news from the front – indeed King Charles has since told me that the Greek forces were in fact in a dangerous plight – and after the preliminary formalities of the conference, which opened on the 30th July, its first work was to accept unanimously the proposal of M. Maioresco, who had been elected President, for a five days' suspension of hostilities.

29. The conference held twelve sittings, but all the really important preparatory work was done at private meetings between the delegates. I will not attempt to record the fragmentary information that reached me of the proceedings at these private meetings. Very briefly it may be said that, as was to be expected from the telegrams which had passed between Sophia and Bucharest, which have been recorded above, the Roumanian and Bulgarian delegates found no difficulty in coming to terms, and M. Maioresco was able to announce at the following sitting on the 4th July that complete agreement had been reached. In making this announcement M. Maioresco said that the arrangement come to was not regarded by the Roumanian Government as a separate agreement between Roumania and Bulgaria, but only as a beginning of the labours of the conference. It was merely a beginning – a portion of the work destined to be included in the general result of the conference. His Excellency added that the private meetings between the other delegates had not yet produced a result which could be submitted to the conference. He urged that these negotiations should be hastened, and concluded by proposing a three days' prolongation or the suspension of hostilities, which was agreed to. M. Maioresco's disclaimer of a separate agreement with Bulgaria, reinforced, as it is believed to have been, by a private warning to the Bulgarian delegates that if they did not come to terms without delay with Servia and Greece, the Roumanian troops would march on Sophia, extinguished any hope the Bulgarian delegates still had of separating Roumania from her co-belligerents. It was clear that there was nothing for them now to do but to come to terms quickly, trusting, perhaps, to a subsequent revision of the treaty by the Great Powers.

30. The next forty-eight hours were marked by great activity amongst the delegates and some of the foreign representatives, with the result that at the plenary meeting of the 6th August a complete agreement on all territorial points was come to. On the following day an armistice *sine die* was ordered, and there remained only the drafting and the signature of the treaty. The draft was read and approved at the plenary sitting of the 8th August. M. Maioresco there announced certain reserves which the Austrian and Russian Ministers had made in regard to the Powers' right to the revision of the treaty, and in particular in regard to the acquisition of Cavalla by Greece (see below), and one of the Bulgarian delegates stated that these reserves had contributed to determine their consent to accept the conditions of peace. The sitting of the following day deserves special mention, because of a declaration of M. Tontchef to the effect that out of deference to the wishes of the Great Powers they had consented to establish a partition of territory acquired from Turkey based solely on considerations of facts. Bulgaria hoped that she would find in the Great Powers support to improve her position in accordance with her sacrifices and with the necessities of her economical and national development. This called forth protests from the Greek, Servian, and Montenegrin delegates, and M. Maioresco declared that in taking act of the protests of the allies

he thought he was expressing a conviction shared by the entire assembly in saying that the terms of the statement made by the first Bulgarian delegate could neither weaken nor impair in any way whatever the juridical value of the treaty.

Treaty of Bucharest

31. The treaty was signed at 10 A.M. on the 10th August. Its signature was announced with a salute of guns, and was followed by a State *Te Deum*. It was greeted by telegrams of congratulation from the Governments of all the Great Powers and from most of their chiefs of State. It seems superfluous to give more than a brief summary of the Treaty of Peace, copy of which was sent home in M. Barclay's despatch No. 86. Article 2 defines the territorial limits between Roumania and Bulgaria, which give the former the maximum of the demands put forward by her from time to time, i.e., a frontier leaving the Danube a few kilometres west of Turtukai, passing a few kilometres south of Dobritch, and sinking to Black Sea a little south of Baltchik. Bulgaria is to dismantle within two years the fortresses of Rustchuk and Shumla, and is not to erect any fortifications either there, or in the intermediate country, or within a zone of 20 kilom. from Baltchik. Article 3 defines the new frontiers between Servia and Bulgaria. Article 4: Servia and Bulgaria undertake to settle their long standing differences concerning their old frontier. Article 5 defines the new frontier between Greece and Bulgaria. Bulgaria renounces all pretensions to Crete. Article 6 deals with the demobilisation to begin within twenty-four hours, of the Bulgarian army. Article 7 provides for the evacuation of Bulgarian territory by the allies within a fortnight of the completion of Bulgarian demobilisation. Article 10 stipulates that the ratifications shall be exchanged at Bucharest within fifteen days.

Subsequent events

32. During the conference my attitude and that of the French and German Ministers was strictly neutral, our action in asking authority of our Governments to make reserves regarding the declination of Cavalla (see *infra*) being dictated solely by the desire to facilitate the work of the conference. The remaining three representatives of the Great Powers were all active, as were also the Roumanian delegates in their efforts to save for Bulgaria as much of Macedonia as possible, the Italian Minister, I am credibly informed, having even gone so far as to urge Bulgaria at one critical moment not to give way about Cavalla as the Powers would probably make reserves about that place.

33. The question of the reserves made by certain of the Great Powers calls for somewhat detailed treatment as at one time there was some confusion as to who had, and who had not made these reserves. In pursuance, as I understand, of a decision taken by the Ambassadors in London, I was instructed on the 23rd July that any arrangements as to the distribution of territory would of course have to be ratified by the Powers after examination, but I was told that I had better not

volunteer this statement until some of my colleagues had similar instructions. I found on enquiry that the only one of my colleagues who had had these instructions was the Austrian Minister, and though he had acted I did not consider myself authorised to follow suit, which I was, moreover, unwilling to do, as I found my French colleague vehemently opposed to any such communication. The question of the specific reserve about Cavalla stood on a different footing, and I should wish it to be recorded that this specific reserve emanated privately from the Roumanian Government itself at a moment when the conference's prospects of success were not of the brightest, and when the Roumanian Government thought that if such a reserve were made by the Great Powers it would improve the chances of peace. The first meetings of the peace delegates had made it clear that the fate of Cavalla would present the greatest difficulty. The Bulgarian delegates were stubborn in this claim to the Port, and, on the other hand, M. Venizelos was quite uncompromising. The latter, however, knowing, perhaps, that there were Powers which would refuse revision, professed to the Roumanian delegates and to one of my colleagues that though he could not yield at the conference Greece would afterwards submit to the pressure of the Great Powers if these were united in their insistence that Cavalla should go to Bulgaria. In these circumstances, M. Take Jonesco, in the course of a visit to the Russian Legation on the 31st July, suggested that in order to make it easier for the Bulgarian delegates to yield, and thus to diminish the chances of a breakdown of the conference, the representatives of the Great Powers should be authorised to declare to M. Maioresco that whatever the decision come to by the conference in regard to Cavalla, the Powers reserved to themselves the right to revise it. M. Schebeko having ascertained privately that this step had M. Maioresco's approval, telegrams were sent in the proposed sense to the respective Governments. The reply I received was to the effect that I might act as proposed when all my colleagues were similarly instructed, but it was to be on the understanding that this did not preclude the Powers from revising other points if they thought necessary. The matter appeared to be pressing, and in view of the decision of the Ambassadors in London (see *supra*) in regard to the general reserves, I had no reason to think that all my colleagues would not, in due course receive instructions analogous to my own. I accordingly informed M. Maioresco of my telegram leaving with him, in order to avoid any mistake, an *aide-mémoire* which embodied its contents and made it perfectly clear that any declaration was only to be made if others made it. Prince Fürstenberg made the declaration on the following day, and two days later, M. Schebeko. The Italian Minister was authorised to do so when all his colleagues acted, and the French Minister was to make it only at the formal request of M. Maioresco, a request never made because by this time the danger of a breakdown of the conference had greatly diminished, and the German Minister received no reply from Berlin. In these circumstances the reserve was only made by Austria and Russia, the former of whom made also a similar reserve about Kochana. I should here mention parenthetically that somehow or other – I prefer to think it was not

M. Maioresco who was responsible – it was falsely stated in the press that I had made reserves about Cavalla in a note which I had subsequently withdrawn. The details I have given are now purely academic, for the question of revision, general or only so far as regarded Cavalla, did not long survive the conclusion of peace as Austria and Russia dropped it when it was made clear by France and Germany that they were strongly opposed to it.

34. Before leaving Bucharest the delegates of Servia, Greece and Montenegro concluded an agreement with Roumania guaranteeing as against Bulgaria the execution of the treaty of peace by all means diplomatic or force of arms. There was also an exchange of notes between Roumania, Servia, and Greece, respectively, by which the two latter countries accorded to their Koutzo Vlahs subjects the same treatment as that stipulated in the treaty for those resident in Bulgaria. Ratifications were exchanged on the 26th August. All Roumanian troops had left Bulgaria by the end of August and official relations between that country and Roumania were resumed on the 11th September when the new Bulgarian Minister, M. Radef, one of the delegates to the conference, presented his credentials. Parliament confirmed the annexation of the new territory on the 5th December and the joint commission appointed to delimit the frontier completed its labours without hitch on the same day when the protocol recording the delimitation was signed on board a Roumanian gunboat at Rustchuk.

35. There remains little to record, so far as Roumania is concerned, in the course of events in the Balkans following the conclusion of the Treaty of Bucharest. Roumania for the most part received the alarms which were raised from time to time in the autumn with equanimity, though she was liberal with her counsels of moderation at Athens and Belgrade, and in her warning at Sophia and Constantinople that the Treaty of Bucharest must not be upset. So far as I am aware she was anxious on two occasions only. The first was in October at the time of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia in regard to the latter's occupation of positions in Albania. I have good reason for thinking that instructions were already drafted to the Minister in Belgrade to warn Servia that she had no support to expect from Roumania, who had no interest in the conflict, when news was received in Bucharest that Servia had yielded, and the instructions were therefore not sent. Some anxiety was felt here also in the early part of November, when the negotiations between Turkey and Greece seemed perilously near to a breakdown, and the moment was chosen for M. Take Jonesco to redeem a promise made to M. Venizelos at the time of the Bucharest Conference that he would visit Athens when the cares of office should permit. During the stay of his ship at Constantinople on his way to Athens, M. Take Jonesco was visited by Talaat Bey, to whom he delivered a warning as to the danger of attempting to upset the Treaty of Bucharest, and on his arrival at Athens he worked hard and successfully to bring about agreement.

Roumania's Interest in Albanian Question

36. The Roumanian Government have shown much interest in the question of the candidature of Prince William of Wied as Ruler of Albania. His Highness is, of course, the nephew of the Queen of Roumania, who has favoured his candidature with characteristic enthusiasm. I fancy that one of the Powers – perhaps Italy – had suggested that it might reduce the danger of a difference of opinion among the Great Powers if the proposal of Prince William's candidature came from Roumania, and when I returned from leave in the beginning of October, M. Maioresco enquired of me whether I knew what His Majesty's Government thought of him as a candidate. This enquiry was repeated twice during the course of November, M. Maioresco on the last occasion being able to tell me that all the other Great Powers had expressed their approval of the Prince, but I was not authorised to do more than to hint politely to M. Maioresco that the selection of the Prince was one for the six Great Powers, and until they had arrived at a definite agreement His Majesty's Government could not discuss it with the Roumanian Government. His Majesty's Government were therefore consulting the other Great Powers. I did not convey this hint because before I next saw M. Maioresco, the position of Ruler of Albania had already been offered to Prince William by the German Government on behalf of the Great Powers.

ROMANIA'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE BALKAN WARS AS REFLECTED
BY BRITISH DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE FROM BUCHAREST (1912–1913)

Abstract

This paper briefly presents the way in which Britain's minister to Bucharest, Sir George Barclay, presented to the Foreign Office, in his annual country reports of 1912 and 1913, Romania's diplomatic involvement in the Balkan wars. Barclay proved to be a keen observer of diplomatic developments in Bucharest, as he scrutinised the context in which Romanian authorities were compelled to finally react after the alteration of the *statu quo* in the Balkans. He referred to several rash decisions taken both in Bucharest and Sofia, as well as to the far reaching consequences of the conflicts on Romania's foreign policy. This paper insists on these miscalculations and diplomatic errors, as they result from Barclay's detailed reports. His correspondence is edited *in extenso* in the appendix of this paper.

Keywords: Balkan Wars, Romania, foreign policy, 1912–1913, Sir George Barclay, Foreign Office, Bucharest, Sofia.